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"Substantive due process is under attack. Judicially, politically,
academically, and even socially, a coalition of forces threatens substantive due
process arguingagainst what it sees as 'social legislation'fromthe bench. "I

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fourteenth Amendment's text is clear and unambiguous in stating that
no individual shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or property without due process
of law." 3 There is only one possible interpretation of this language, and that is to
protect procedural, not "substantive" rights.
As such, the concept of substantive due process is the most intellectually
dishonest doctrine in the history of the United State Supreme Court's
jurisprudence. In fact, there exists only one case in which the Court has focused4
upon the procedural aspect of the Due Process Clause. In Mathews v. Eldridge,
which concerned an individual whose disability payments had been terminated, 5
the Court held that to comport with the constitutional mandate of the Due
Process Clause three factors must be considered before an individual is deprived
of a liberty or property interest: (1) "the private interest that will be affected by
the official action," (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used," and (3) "the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards." 6 Finally, the Court found relevant "the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.", 7 Therefore, in Mathews, the Court effectively defined and gave

1. Brandon R. Johnson, Note, "Emerging Awareness" After the Emergence of Roberts:
Reasonable Societal Reliance in Substantive Due Process Inquiry, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 1587, 158788 (2006) (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).
2.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
3.
Id. (emphasis added).
4.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
5.
Id. at 323-24.
6.
Id. at 334-35.
7.
Id.
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Amendment's language concerning what constitutes
meaning to the Fourteenth
'8
"due process of law."
Unfortunately, however, in what is perhaps the greatest example of judicial
overreaching in the history of modern jurisprudence, the Court later found that
the Due Process Clause had a substantive component. 9 The purpose of the
Court's invention was, as some have opined, to protect "individual rights not
specifically listed in the text of the Constitution against State encroachment, no
matter how democratically enacted." 10 Additionally, at least one scholar has
asserted that the doctrine was designed to ensure "equal treatment,"11 while

acknowledging that "the concept can work against processes, including
democratic ones." 12 It has also been asserted that substantive due process is
intended to protect "all citizens regardless of how insular or marginalized those
citizens may be,",13 and is an "indispensable doctrine for protecting minority
rights." 14 Ultimately, though, the most important purpose of this judicially
created doctrine-and the most troubling-is to recognize new "fundamental
rights" that cannot be found in the text of the Constitution. 15 The Court has
justified its self-appointed lawmaking power by asserting, inter alia, that these
that "neither liberty nor
rights are "so implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"
16
justice would exist if [that interest] were sacrificed."
However, there is one glaring problem with the Court's jurisprudence from
which it cannot escape. The doctrine of substantive due process and the
recognition of fundamental rights has occurred "despite the lack of express
textual support within the [Constitution]. ' 7 This fact, however, has not

8.
See id.
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
9.
(describing how the Court's majority believed that the Due Process Clause can be interpreted in
correlation with the Bill of Rights as a means of protecting certain rights).
10. Aaron J. Shuler, From Immutable to Existential: Protecting Who We Are and Who We
Want to Be with the "Equalerty" of the Substantive Due Process Clause, 12 J.L. & SOC.
CHALLENGES 220, 223 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
11. Id. at 224.
12. Id. at 223-24.
13. Id. at 224.
14. Id. at 227.
15. Id. at 225 (noting that "advocates of the preservation and protection of fundamental rights
sought to ground their arguments in the Constitution, despite the lack of express textual support
within the document itself').
16. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 n.3 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Shuler, supra note 10, at 225; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15
TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1502-08 (1999) (discussing the evolution of substantive due process);
Johnson, supra note 1, at 1593-94 ("[Tlhose opposed to such a method of constitutional
interpretation retort that too much power then rests with the 'subjective considerations' of the
individual Justices. Complaints about the elitist, anti-democratic nature of the interpretation
follow .... Other criticisms of a broad substantive due process include that the Court disrespects
the Constitution when it reads too much into it... and the Court, in moving too far beyond the text
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appeared to influence the Court whatsoever. Amazingly, the Court has used the
Due Process Clause to hold that a woman has a fundamental right to abort a
pregnancy prior to viability.1 8 The Court has also recognized that homosexuals,
and implicitly heterosexuals, have the right to engage in sodomy. 19 Furthermore,
some lower courts have relied on the Due Process Clause to recognize a right to
In so doing, the Court, as well as some lower courts, has
gay marriage.
unilaterally found that there are substantive liberty and privacy interests in the
Due Process Clause, which effectively act as an umbrella to include certain types
of rights. 2' In other words, in what is essentially a de facto revision of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has tried to justify its reasoning by stating that
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. ''22 In other words,
the Due Process Clause protects substantive rights because the Court thinks it
should.
Substantive Due Process has been and continues to be a very dangerous
enterprise. First, it requires the Court to engage in a subjective, unanchored
theory of constitutional interpretation that is likely to give way to individual
predilection. This was underscored in Lawrence, where Justice Kennedy relied
upon an "emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial 2protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives." ' To support his
"emerging awareness" approach, Justice Kennedy relied upon a case from the
European Court of Human Rights that invalidated a statute banning consensual
24
The problem with Justice Kennedy's interpretive
homosexual conduct.
paradigm and use of the substantive due process doctrine is that the decision
25
itself seems more like a policy discussion than a legal determination.
This underscores the second, and closely related, problem with this
jurisprudence-it allows the Court to act as a legislative body and removes from
public debate, and the democratic process, important issues concerning values,
morality, and equality. 26 It is not the Court's job to act as an anti-majoritarian

of the Constitution, has become too unstable." (footnotes omitted) (quoting Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting))).
18. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
19. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
20. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 959 (Mass. 2003) (stating
that deciding whether and whom to marry is a basic Due Process right regardless of sexual
orientation).
21. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-65 (citations omitted) (discussing numerous cases in
which the Court has found that "the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a
substantive dimension" that allows for the recognition of certain rights).
22. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484,
23. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
24. Id. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 149, 151, 168 (1981)).
25. See id. at 578 (explaining the rationale behind Justice Kennedy's decision).
26.

See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDIcIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 249 (1977) (noting that the Court, through substantive due process,
"substitute[s] [its] own views of policy for those of [the] legislat[ure]").
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entity.
Likewise, it is not the Court's role to ensure equality of result.
It is
also not the Court's responsibility to decide social issues.2 9 Quite simply, the
issue of whether policies are fair or unfair, prudent or improvident, is best left to
the voters and their respective representatives, not nine unelected and far
removed jurists.
The Court has made a mistake of such moment that it has threatened its
institutional legitimacy. Its role is neither to make law nor to create new rights
that not only are without constitutional foundation, but that also usurp the
legislature's function to engage in important policy debates on critical social
issues.3° The Court's duty is far more limited; it should invalidate legislation
only when it violates a specific provision in the Constitution. When performing
this function, if a challenged law implicates a particular provision, and that
provision is ambiguous, then the Court should look to the Founders' intent and
expectations, history and tradition, and prior decisional law.
This Article offers a three-part solution, reflecting the modest role within
which the Court should act. First, the Court should reject the doctrine of
substantive due process and refuse to create new rights that simply cannot be
divined from the text. Second, the Court should increasingly use the Equal
Protection Clause to invalidate legislation that either discriminates,

differentiates, or both, among various groups absent meaningful and justifiable
reasons.

The Equal Protection Clause was designed to address precisely this

type of discrimination, inequality, and rights-infringement that offends our core
notions of liberty. 3'

Part two of this Article's solution proposes a new standard for Equal
Protection Clause analysis. Currently, the Court uses a three-tiered approach.32
If a law infringes upon what the Court has deemed a "suspect class," namely,

race, alienage, or national origin, then it applies "strict scrutiny,"33 which
upholds legislation only if it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state
interest.34 The second tier of review is "intermediate scrutiny," which is less

27. See id. at 249-50.
28. See MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 158 (1991).
29. See Dwight G. Duncan, How Brown Is Goodridge? The Appropriation of a Legal Icon,
14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 27, 39 (2004).
30. See Edwin Meese III, A Return to Constitutional Interpretationfrom Judicial LawMaking, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 925, 925 (1996) (noting that the Court's proper role is to act as a
"judicial institution" and not as a "political caucus" or "super-legislature").
31. See Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp., 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918).
32. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in ConstitutionalAnalysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV.
297, 303 (1997).
33. Brian C. Crook, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board: A Picture Is Worth a
Thousand Words and Exactly One Vote, 9 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 373, 378
n. 4 7 (2009) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).
34. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (quoting Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)) (explaining the process for reviewing government imposed
racial classifications).
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stringent and applied to laws that discriminate on the basis of gender. 35 This
standard requires that the legislation be "substantially related to a legitimate state
interest.,36 Finally, if a law does not infringe upon race, national origin, or
gender, even though it may infringe on age or disability, then it is subject to the
highly deferential "rational basis" standard,37 which finds nearly all legislation
constitutional provided that there is some reasonable basis underlying the
enactment. 38 This Article argues that the three-tiered approach is inherently
unequal because differential treatment among different groups should not
translate into discriminatory treatment of those groups by the Court. Rather,
legislation that discriminates against a group should be subject to the same
standard, with a consideration of the following factors: (1) whether there is a
specific and necessary basis justifying the differential treatment; (2) why the
relevant differentiation is needed and cannot be achieved by granting equal rights
to all; (3) what prior efforts, if any, to address a particular problem were
undertaken; (4) why such efforts have failed or would fail; (5) whether there
remain untried alternatives; and (6) why the challenged legislation is reasonably
likely to succeed in achieving the statute's stated objectives. This standard will
ensure equality of treatment without reading into the Constitution rights that do
not exist.
Finally, the third part of this Article's proposed solution is that, if the Court
does, in very narrow circumstances, recognize a new right or invalidate
legislation that impermissibly restricts an already recognized right, then the
39
Court should use the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause
as its justificatory basis. This clause, not the Due Process Clause, should be used
only in those narrow circumstances where our Nation's history and traditions
counsel in favor of recognizing a new right. In doing so, however, the Court
must overrule the Slaughter-House Cases,4 which construed the Privileges and
Immunities Clause in a constitutionally unjustifiable manner. 41
Part II discusses the Court's analytical framework governing substantive due
process and then focuses on the history and application of the Equal Protection
Clause, along with a discussion of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Part III
examines the most important substantive due process decisions in the modern
era, and explains that some of these decisions were wrong because they have no
textual support whatsoever in the Due Process Clause. Those cases that were
correctly decided, however, find justification in the Equal Protection Clause and,

35. Crook, supra note 33, at 378 n.47 (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440).
36. Id. at 441 (quoting Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
37. Id. at 378 n.47 (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41).
38. See Michelle Adams, Is Integration a Discriminatory Purpose?, 96 IOWA L. REv. 837,
849 (2011).
39. U.S. CONST.amend. XIV, § 1.
40. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
41. See A. Christopher Bryant, What McDonald Means for UnenumeratedRights, 45 GA. L.
REV. 1073,1076 (2011) (citing Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36).
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to an extent, the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The discussion of these
cases is designed to provide a guide to how future cases of this type might be
interpreted by state and federal courts. Part IV sets forth a particular example
that may come before the Court, the gay rights cases, and examines lower court
decisions that have confronted the issue. Based on these decisions, this Article
proposes how the Supreme Court should rule if the issue of gay marriage were to
come before the Court.
II.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION:

A JUDICIAL

INVENTION VERSUS A COMMITMENT TO EQUALITY

A.

Substantive Due Process

The Court's substantive due process jurisprudence is consistent in an
important respect-not one case in this area, and there are many, interprets the
text of the Due Process Clause itself.42 The reason is not surprising. The text
not only fails to support the Court's decisions, but is inconsistent with, and
contrary to, every case in which the Court has found substantive "rights" where
none can possibly be divined from the Clause's plain language.43 The Court's
convenient, self-serving method to circumvent this obstacle was to invent
various "standards" or "criteria" by which it would declare
certain rights
44
fundamental and worthy of enhanced constitutional protection.
For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court applied the Due Process
Clause to invalidate a statute that prohibited the use of contraception.45 What
was more important than the decision itself was the Court's dicta concerning the
scope and nature of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In its majority
opinion, the Court held that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance. 46 In addition, the Court found that there were "zones of
privacy '47 in the Constitution that prohibited the state from interfering in the

42. See John Tuskey, And They Became One Flesh: One Catholic's Response to Victor
Romero's "Other" ChristianPerspective on Lawrence v. Texas, 35 S.U. L. REV. 631, 657 & n.169
(2008) (citing John Tuskey, What's a Lower Court to Do? Limiting Lawrence v. Texas and the
Right to Sexual Autonomy, 21 TOURO L. REV. 597, 611 (2005)).
43. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 543 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)
(noting that substantive due process is "suggested neither by [the Due Process Clause's] language
nor by preconstitutional history").
44. See Anne Lawton, The Frankenstein Controversy: The Constitutionalityof a FederalBan
on Cloning, 87 KY. L.J. 277, 337 (1998) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92
(1986)).
45. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307
(1964)).
46. Id. at 484.
47. Id.
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marital relationship. 48 Consequently, Griswold is a monumental case 49
because it
created an independent right to privacy within the Due Process Clause.
After Griswold, the Court proceeded to invent various standards by which it
assessed whether a right was entitled to protection under its substantive due
process jurisprudence. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,50 for example, the Court further
defined its privacy doctrine by explaining, in the marital context, that "[i]f the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
, 51
child.
The Court's formulations did not stop there, and have given way to
additional standards that expand upon the concepts of privacy and liberty that it
transposed on the Due Process Clause. To begin with, when determining
whether to recognize a new right under the Due Process Clause, which it also
calls a "fundamental" right,52 the Court begins its analysis "by examining our
Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices." 53 Indeed, fundamental liberty
rights must be "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental. 54
In other words, it must "be an interest traditionally protected by our
society 55 and among "those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 56 However, Justice
Kennedy, with the support of at least two other Justices, has stated that "[h]istory
and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the
substantive due process inquiry., 57 For example, the Court has held that the
privacy interest protected by the Due Process Clause could be expanded based
upon an "emerging awareness" 58 of contemporary practices, which could include
a discussion of foreign precedent.59

48. Id. at 485-86 (citing Flowers, 377 U.S. at 307).
49. See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Legacy of Griswold, 16 OHO N.U. L. REv. 511, 512
(1989).
50. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
51. Id. at 453.
52. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997).
53. Id. at 710.
54. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 751 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989).
56. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (citations omitted).
57. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting County
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., id. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 149, 151, 168
(1981)) (discussing foreign precedent and its relation to the Lawrence case).
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Importantly, those rights that are deemed fundamental qualify for strict
scrutiny. 60 Thus, any legislation infringing upon such rights must be "narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest." t Otherwise, legislation that does
not infringe on a fundamental right is generally subject to "rational basis
review, ' 62 and "will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest." 63 By applying this precedent, the
Court has recognized many fundamental rights through the right to privacy and
liberty concepts that the Court has somehow managed to read into the Due
Process Clause. 64 As stated, however, whatever standards the Court uses to
justify creating these interests, the Court cannot escape from one fact: "[t]he
Constitution does not explicitly mention any6 right of privacy ' 65 and the Due
Process Clause speaks only of fair procedures.
Importantly, although they do not represent the majority, other Justices on
the Court have arguably taken the correct approach by acting with restraint and
caution regarding the substantive due process doctrine. In Glucksberg, for
example, Justice Scalia explained that "we 'ha[ve] always been reluctant to
expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for
responsible decision making in this unchartered area are scarce and openended."' 67 Scalia explained that "[b]y extending constitutional protection to an
asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the
arena of public debate and legislative action." 68 As a result, the Court must
"'exercise the utmost care whenever [it is] asked to break new ground in this
field,' ... lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly
transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of [the] Court." 9
Furthermore, Justice Scalia explained that "[the Court has] required in
substantive-due-process cases a 'careful description' of the asserted fundamental

60. Id. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721
(1997)).
61. Id. (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
62. See, e.g., id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that review of general economic or
tax legislation is subject to the rational basis test).
63. Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
64. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (holding that a homosexual's right to liberty under
the Due Process Clause "gives them the full right to engage in [sodomy]" within the confines of
their home "without intervention of the government"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973)
(holding that a woman has the right to have an abortion up to a certain point in the pregnancy).
65. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
66. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
67. 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125
(1992)).
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125) (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 502 (1977)).
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liberty interest. '70 These principles
"direct and restrain [the Court's] exposition
71
of the Due Process Clause.",
Justice Scalia got it right, except for the fact that he could have gone further
and advocated for the abolition, rightly so, of substantive due process. The
Court's substantive due process jurisprudence is fatally flawed because it has
nothing whatsoever to do with the language of the clause itself. The text is clear
and unambiguous; before an individual is deprived of life, liberty, or property,
there must be adequate procedures for the purpose of ensuring fairness and
justice.72 The Court has not only invented specific rights under this clause,73 but
it has, de facto, re-written this entire section.
Nothing could be more anathema to a society that relies upon democratic
policies, not an activist court, to resolve important social issues. In the area of
substantive due process, the Court has acted more like a legislative body than a
judicial institution. In so doing, it has deprived the people and their
representatives from resolving important social policy issues. It has diminished
the power of the voting process to effectuate change because, due to its prior
holdings, many now mistakenly look to the Court, not the election process, as the
means by which to decide important political issues. 74 That is not, and has never
been, the Court's role.75 As set forth below, this has lead to some of the worst
constitutional law decisions in history.
B. Equal Protection

Contrary to the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause provides a
principled basis upon which to protect liberties that lie at the core of a free, fair,
equal, and just society. As evidenced in the text itself, the Equal Protection
Clause is designed to scrutinize legislative enactments that discriminate or
differentiate between or among groups in an unjustifiable manner. 76 The Equal
Protection Clause is the method by which to protect substantive rights against
arbitrary, purposeless, or otherwise improper state action.

70. Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)) (citing Collins, 503 U.S. at
125; Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277-78 (1990)).
71. Id.
72. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
73. See James Bopp Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Roe v. Wade and the Euthanasia Debate, 12
IssuEs L. & MED. 343 n.1 (1997) (noting that the Court's substantive due process analysis has
permitted the Court "to create new constitutional rights by reading them into the 'liberty'
guaranteed by the due process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment).
74. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
75. See Jeffrey D. Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the Rational Basis Test: Saving
Substantive Due Processand Redeeming the Promise of the Ninth Amendment, 45 U. RICH. L. REv.
491, 535 (2011) ("[Cjourts should keep to the areas in which they have competence, and leave the
wisdom of policy to the legislature.").
76. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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As discussed below, instead of using the Due Process Clause to find or
protect substantive rights, the Court should use the Equal Protection Clause.
However, the only problem with the Court's Equal Protection analysis is the
three-tiered approach that it has used in analyzing legislation that differentiates
among various groups. This is inherently unequal because all areas of
discrimination, regardless of classification, demand an equal and exacting level
of scrutiny. As discussed in Part II.B.3, that scrutiny should take the form of a
six-part test to govern all cases involving the application of the Equal Protection
Clause.
1.

The Equal Protection Clause-Historyand Purpose

The Equal Protection Clause, and the entirety of the Fourteenth Amendment
was written "to ensure that recently freed slaves enjoyed the same privileges as
their fellow citizens. 77 As Professor Shuler explains, the Equal Protection
Clause "was to protect the immutability of their race by affording them the same
rights (the equality), as well as to unshackle them from slavery, enabling them to
determine the course of their own lives (the existential). 78 Indeed, "the
principal aim of the drafters and ratifiers ... was to eradicate official antebellum

discrimination against blacks, particularly the so-called 'Black Codes,' pursuant
to which blacks were treated as a lower or second-class caste., 79 Indeed, in the
Thirty-Ninth Congress, one senator criticized the Codes for "deriv[ing] [some]
As Professor
citizen[s] of civil rights which are secured to other citizens."
Saunders explains, the Founders "recognized, and most certainly intended, that
subjecting African Americans
this provision would... invalidate most state ' laws
8
to special disadvantage because of their race. 1
Importantly, however, "the rule they adopted was not confined to that
narrow purpose, and the vice at which it struck was not the consideration of race
per se but rather the use of governmental power to single out certain classes of
In the record of the Thirty-Ninth
persons for special benefits or burdens."
Congress, particularly concerning the Black Codes, senators criticized them as
impermissible "class legislation, ' 83 and even President Andrew Johnson stated
that "'there is no room for favored classes or monopolies,' for 'the principle of
our Government is that of equal laws,' which 'accord "equal and exact justice to

77. Shuler, supra note 10, at 222.
78. Id. (footnotes omitted).
79. Timothy Zick, Angry White Males: The Equal Protection Clause and "Classes of One,"
89 KY. L.J. 69,71 (2000).
80. Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH.
L. REv. 245, 272 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 474
(1866)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id. at 269.
82. Id.
83. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., IST SESS. 704 (1866) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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all men," special privileges to none." ' 84 In essence, therefore, the Equal
Protection Clause was not simply designed to address discrimination on the basis
of race, but rather to "require[] the state to justify any difference in
85 procedural or
substantive treatment of one person [or group] vis-A-vis another."
However, early Supreme Court jurisprudence still focused on race, although
it would soon be broadened. In Strauder v. West Virginia,86 the Court was
confronted with the issue of whether African Americans could be excluded from
serving on juries. 87 In answering this question in the negative, the Court held as
follows:
[African Americans] especially needed protection against unfriendly
action in the States where they were resident[s]. It was in view of these
considerations [that] the Fourteenth Amendment was framed and
adopted. It was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of
all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and
in that
to give to that race the protection of the general government,
88
enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the States.
As the majority explained, the Equal Protection Clause "not only gave
citizenship and the privileges of citizenship to persons of color, but it denied to
any State the power to withhold from them the equal protection of the laws,
89 and
authorized Congress to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation.,
The Court expanded its application of the Equal Protection Clause in Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, where it held that any unjustifiable discrimination was
constitutionally impermissible:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment... intended not only that there should be
no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of
property, but that equal protection and security should be given to all
under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil
rights; that all persons should be equally entitled to pursue their
happiness and acquire and enjoy property[,] ...have like access to the

84. Saunders, supra note 80, at 273 (quoting 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OFTHE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 361-62 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897)).
85. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection,47
UCLA L. REv. 1183, 1188 (2000).
86. 100 U.S. 303 (1879), abrogatedby Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
87. Id. at 305.
88. /d.at 306.
89. Id. at 306-07. This decision was in stark contrast to Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, which
sanctioned overt discrimination against African Americans.
90. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Also see The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), which
promulgated the "state action" doctrine. Specifically, the Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause only applied to conduct done or otherwise sanctioned by the state. Id. at 11.
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courts of the country for the protection of their persons and property, the
prevention and redress of wrongs... [and that] [c]lass legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited, but
legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its
application, if within the sphere of its operation it 91
affects alike all
persons similarly situated, is not within the amendment.
Accordingly, the majority held that "[t]hese provisions [of the Equal
Protection Clause] are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of
equal laws.
2.

92

ContemporaryApplication
a.

Different Levels of Scrutiny

Modem jurisprudence interpreting and applying the Equal Protection Clause
reflects earlier precedent in that it continues to scrutinize legislation that
differentiates among various groups.
However, the Court's analytical
framework has changed, arguably causing the agplication of the Clause itself to
be inconsistent with its commitment to equality.

91. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 367-68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Id. at 369.
93. While not necessarily included in the modem era jurisprudence, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), are landmark cases dealing with segregation between blacks and
whites. In Plessy, the Court found constitutional a statute requiring that railroads carrying
passengers provide separate but equal accommodations for blacks and whites. 163 U.S. at 550-51.
In so holding, the Court stated that "we think the enforced separation of the races, as applied to the
internal commerce of the state, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man,
deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of the
laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 548. Before Brown, the Court
decided several cases that signaled a move away from the separate-but-equal doctrine. In Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), the Court held that a democratic primary, which restricted voting to
whites, was unconstitutional. See id. at 662, 666. In Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the
Court held that judicial enforcement of a restrictive covenant that denied individuals ownership or
occupation on the basis of race constituted an equal protection violation. Id. at 20-21. In Sweatt v.
Painter,339 U.S. 629 (1950), the Court held that separate law schools for blacks and whites, where
the school for blacks was inferior, was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 633-35. In
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), the Court held
that, while the State of Oklahoma admitted McLaurin to its doctorate program, the restrictions
imposed upon him, such as not commingling with white students, was unconstitutional. Id. at 64142. In Brown, the Court held that separate schools for whites and blacks, even if of equal quality,
were inherently unequal and thus violative of the Equal Protection Clause. 347 U.S. at 495. After
Brown, in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), the Court held
that a "'freedom-of-choice' plan," where whites could choose to attend traditionally black schools
and vice-versa, did not meet the desegregation mandate. Id. at 441-42 (footnote omitted). In
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The seminal case creating the Court's modem paradigm was United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 94 where it was suggested that discrimination, or

differential treatment, of different classes may warrant varying levels of judicial
scrutiny. 95 In Carolene, the Court stated in dicta that "prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry."' 96

The Court was more explicit in Korematsu v. United

97

States, where it held that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect... [and while] all such restrictions
are [not] unconstitutional ... courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny."' 9 8 Importantly, in Loving v. Virginia,99 the Court applied the strict

scrutiny standard to invalidate a ban on interracial marriage. 10 In applying strict
scrutiny, the Court stated:
At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial
classifications ... be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny," . . . and, if
they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the

accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the
racial

discrimination ...[that]

designed] to eliminate.

10 1

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

[was

In Craig v. Boren,102 the Court applied a separate standard of review when
confronting gender discrimination-intermediate scrutiny. 103

This standard

required the state to demonstrate that the statute served "important governmental

Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court held that the
pairing and grouping of "noncontiguous school zones" was permissible as a tool to achieve
desegregation. Id. at 28. Finally, in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the Court found
improper the district court's remedy of ordering busing between rather than within districts. Id. at
744-45.
94. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
95. See id. at 152-53 n.4.
96. Id. at 153 n.4 (citing Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932)); see also Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (intimating that a heightened level of scrutiny would be
applied to distinctions based on ancestry because they are "by their very nature odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality").
97. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
98. Id. at216.
99. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
100. Id. at 11-12.
101. Id. at 11 (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216).
102. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
103. Id. at 197 (The statute at issue in Craig prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2%
beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Craig, a male 18-20 years of
age, and a vendor of 3.2% beer challenged the statute on the basis of gender discrimination.).
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objectives" and was "substantially related to [the] achievement of those
objectives." 104
Finally, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,' 5 the Court

discussed its highly deferential rational basis standard as opposed to strict
scrutiny, explaining that "legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest."' 1 6 Importantly, however, "[lthe general rule gives
10 7
way.., when a statute [is] classified by race, alienage, or national origin."
These "factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice
and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or
deserving as others."10 8 Thus, "because such discrimination is unlikely to be
soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are subject[] to strict scrutiny and
will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state
interest."'l°9
Now, with regard to specific classes, as stated above, gender is subject to
intermediate scrutiny. 110 This heightened standard is due to the fact that
"statutes distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways
very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and
women."' 1 Similarly, because "illegitimacy is beyond the individual's control
and bears 'no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute
to society,' ... official discriminations resting on that characteristic are also
subject to [a] heightened [standard of] review. '
Significantly, however, the Court has applied rational basis review to nearly
every other class upon which legislation differentiates. For example, in City of
Cleburne, the Court, in addition to noting that physical disability and age are not
subject to heightened review, held that mental retardation was not entitled to a
heightened standard of review. 3
As one commentator explained,
"classifications based on physical disability and intelligence are typically
accepted as legitimate, even by judges and commentators who assert that

104. Id.
105. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
106. Id. at 440 (citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); City of New Orleans
v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 372 (1971)).
110. Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Slaying the Inequality Villain in School Finance: Is
the Right to Education the Silver Bullet?, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 351, 357 n.23 (2011).
111. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
112. Id. (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976)).
113. See id. at 441-42 (citing Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)).
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immutability is relevant."' 4 Specifically, "those characteristics... are often
relevant to legitimate purposes.""1l 5 Additionally, "[w]hen social or economic
legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide
decisions will
latitude... and the Constitution presumes that even1' 1improvident
6
eventually be rectified by the democratic processes."
b. DisparateIntent v. DisparateImpact
The Equal Protection Clause also protects against laws that, while not
differentiating among groups, evince discriminatory intent. 1 7 An important
related issue is whether the clause is violated when there is no evidence of
discriminatory intent, but the law nonetheless leads to unequal results or
disparate impact. In two landmark cases, the Court answered this question in the
negative. In Washington v. Davis,118 the Court stated that "[its] cases have not
embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to
whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact." 119 For example, with respect
to the exclusion of African Americans on juries, "[a] purpose to discriminate
must be present which may be proven by systematic exclusion of eligible
jurymen of the proscribed race or by unequal application of the law to such an
extent as to show intentional discrimination."' 12 However, "[t]his is not to say
that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose must be express or appear on the
face of the statute, or that the law's disproportionate impact is irrelevant in cases
involving Constitution-based claims of racial discrimination."' 2 ' Thus, "[a]
statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to

114. Id. at 442-43 n.10 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 150 (1980)).

115. Id. (quoting ELY, supra note 114). It could be argued that, in select cases, the Supreme
Court has applied a fourth standard of review, although it has never been formally adopted by the
Court. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (holding that to justify sexbased discrimination, the defendants must set forth "exceedingly persuasive" reasons for the
differential treatment).
116. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (citing U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174
(1980); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam)).
117. See Nirej S. Sekhon, Equality & Identity Hierarchy, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 349, 412
(2008).
118. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
119. Id. at 239. In its analysis, the Court distinguished between the constitutional rule, equal
protection, and that governing Title VII cases. As the Court explained, "employees or applicants
proceeding under [Title VII] need not concern themselves with the employer's possibly
discriminatory purpose but instead may focus solely on the racially differential impact of the
challenged hiring or promotion practices." Id. at 238-39; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (noting that Congress directed "the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation").
120. Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945).
121. Washington, 426 U.S. at 241.
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discriminate on the basis of race."'' 22 In this way, "an invidious discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including
'12
the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another."
Critically, however, the Court has not held that a law, "neutral on its face
and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater
proportion of one race than of another." 124 As stated above, while
disproportionate impact is a consideration, "it is not the sole touchstone
of... invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution, ' 25 and by
itself, "does not trigger the rule... that racial classifications are to be subjected
to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of
considerations." 126

3. A New Approach-Adoption of a Unitary Standard

While the Supreme Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence is
comprehensive, it is, in many ways, discriminatory in both theory and
application. Specifically, it differentiates between various groups of people with
no apparent justification, and on very sensitive grounds, such as race, gender,
disability, age, sexual orientation, and mental retardation. 27 The Court's
decisional law does not offer sufficient reasons to justify its own discrimination
when analyzing a constitutional provision that was designed for the purpose of
preventing discrimination. Perhaps the most deleterious consequence of these
non-justifiable classifications is the extraordinarily deferential treatment, via the
rational basis test, 128 that the Court gives to states when passing laws that
differentiate between classes that should, at the very least, warrant more exacting
scrutiny. Surprisingly, state legislation that discriminates on age, disability,
retardation, and homosexuality "is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if

122. Id. (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886)).
123. Id. at 242.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)); see also Viii. of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) (noting that "official action will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact").
127. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985)
(citations omitted) (describing the various levels of review used by the Supreme Court to determine
whether classifications based on race, gender, age, or socioeconomic status violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
128. See, e.g., id. at 440, 442 (citations omitted) (noting that under the rational basis test state
laws are presumed to be valid so long as they are rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest and that, in particular, statutory classifications based on mental retardation are only subject
to rational basis review).
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the classification
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
1 29
interest."'
The Equal Protection Clause requires much more. Its promise of equal
treatment should not lead to unequal adjudication. Discrimination in all forms
should be justified on both a principled and pragmatic basis, with the state
having at least the burden of showing something more than merely a presumed
rational basis underlying its enactment. Of course, the state can certainly be
justified in treating different people differently, but it needs to demonstrate
before a court that its reasons justify the ill that the Equal Protection Clause
sought to eradicate. Thus, this Article proposes that the Court conduct a more
stringent analysis by employing the following factors: (1) a specific and
necessary basis justifying the differential treatment of a certain group, (2) why
the relevant group differentiation is needed and cannot be achieved by granting
equal rights to all, (3) what prior efforts, if any, to address a particular problem
were undertaken, (4) why such efforts have failed, (5) whether there remain
untried alternatives, and (6) why the challenged legislation is reasonably likely to
succeed in achieving the statute's objectives. The Court's application of these
factors will allow it to probe the practical and policy reasons justifying and
motivating a particular statutory scheme in greater detail and with much more
specificity. As a result, this set of factors, or something akin to it, should be
adopted to serve an important protective function. In addition, as set forth below,
the Privileges and Immunities Clause can play an important, albeit incremental
role in the Court's jurisprudence.
C. The Privilegesand Immunities Clause

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."'3
Arguably, this

clause, in stark contrast to the Due Process Clause, could provide the Court with
some basis upon which to recognize fundamental rights that are "deeply rooted
in [our] Nation's history and tradition[s].,, 13 However, the Court's application
of this clause, unlike its substantive due process jurisprudence, must be modest
and incremental, reflecting deference for the state legislatures on important
policy issues.

129. Id. at 440 (citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); City of New Orleans
v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam)).
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
131. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Washington, 521 U.S. at 721) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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1. The Slaughter-House Cases
To use the Privileges and Immunities Clause to recognize fundamental
rights, the Court must first overrule the Slaughter-House Cases.132 Inthese
cases, the issue before the Court was whether the Privileges and Immunities
Clause protected citizens not only from the infringement of liberties guaranteed
by the federal government, but also by state governments. 133 In a muchcriticized opinion, 134 the Court held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
did not, apart from the most basic fundamental rights, grant the citizens any
rights, unless they were specifically conferred upon them by the state. 135 In
other words, the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause was
not intended "to transfer the security and protection"' 136 of fundamental freedoms
to the Federal government.137 As a result, the Court "consigned the fundamental
freedoms that Americans
rightfully regard as their birthright to the dubious
' 38
protection of the States."'

The Court's ruling was predicated on its interpretation of a part of the clause
which states that "[aill persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
States wherein they reside."' 139 In construing this language, the Court held that
"persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship
of a particular State."' 40 In other words, "the distinction between citizenship of
the United States and citizenship of a State is clearly recognized and
established,"' 141 and "a man [may] be a citizen of the United States without being
a citizen of a State."' 42 As result, "there is a citizenship of the United States, and
a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which depend
143
upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual."'
Accordingly, with its exceedingly narrow interpretation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and expansive version of state police power, the Court held
that "the several States ... as [they] grant or establish [rights] to [their] own
citizens, or as [they] limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on their

132. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
133. Id. at 55.
134. See, e.g., Wilson R. Huhn, The Legacy of Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank in
ConstitutionalInterpretation,42 AKRON L. REV. 1051, 1053-54 (2009) (noting that "legal scholars
almost unanimously agree with the four dissenters that the Court answered [the Privileges or
Immunities Clause] question wrong").
135. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77-79.
136. Id. at 77.
137. See id. at 77-79.
138. Huhn, supra note 134, at 1054.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
140. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 73.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 74.
143. Id.
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exercise ... shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within
[that State's] jurisdiction."1 4
The Slaughter-House Cases effectively nullified the federal government's
power to use the Privileges and Immunities Clause to invalidate state laws that
infringed upon basic rights, or to grant rights that are critical to the exercise of
liberty, freedom, and equality. The case was a mistake. The Privileges and
Immunities Clause, unlike the concept of substantive due process, grants textual
support for the Court to, in a modest and restrained manner, invalidate State laws
that violate specific provisions of the Constitution because these provisions are a
source of particular rights for the people. It also gives the Court authority to
recognize basic rights that are deeply rooted in our nation's history and
traditions. 145
Accordingly, as the end nears for the progressive substantive due process
doctrine, so should it mark the beginning for a more robust Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Importantly, while the clause can serve to protect and
safeguard constitutional rights, it should nonetheless be deferential to state
legislatures, their lawmaking authority, and the democratic process. This is
particularly true when the Court is confronted with social matters and the
legislature has not yet passed laws concerning a particular issue. In taking a
more cautious yet protective role under the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
the Court will be tasked with interpreting the Constitution's text and, in some
cases, the Framers' original intentions and expectations. Necessarily, this will
implicate various methods of constitutional interpretation, and the method or
framework adopted by the Court will have a direct influence on the scope and
breadth of the Court's decisional law. As such, the following section provides a
discussion of the different and most relevant types of interpretation and
concludes by promulgating the method of interpretation that would work best in
deciding important Privileges and Immunity Clause issues that will ultimately
come before the Court.
2.

Methods of ConstitutionalInterpretation

The primary methods of interpretation that have relevance to constitutional
adjudication in this context are: (1) textualism, (2) originalism, (3) pragmatism,
(4) minimalism, and (5) pluralismt.46 Each of these theories will be discussed in
turn.

Textualism is a method of interpretation advocated and implemented by
Justice Scalia, who believes that when judges are deciding legal questions, they

144. Id. at 77.
145. See Huhn, supra note 134, at 1054.
146. See Adam Lamparello, Incorporating the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
Framework into Substantive Due ProcessJurisprudence Through the Introduction of a ContingentBased and Legislatively-Driven ConstitutionalTheory, 88 NEB. L. REv. 692, 701 (2010).
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are engaged in the interpretation of a text. t47 In essence, a proper decision is one
that results from adhering to the text of the document being interpreted. 48 In so
doing, a court should not interpret a text narrowly or broadly, but reasonably, so
that it may give a proper construction to the terms being construed.14 Where
statutory language is ambiguous, Justice Scalia does not believe that legislative
history should serve as a resource
because, in his view, the words' "objective
50
indication" constitutes law. 1
Originalism is also an interpretive paradigm for which Justice Scalia has
long been a supporter and advocate. For the originalist, the text of the
Constitution should often dictate the outcome in matters involving constitutional
law. 15t Importantly, to ascertain the meaning of the Constitution's text, Scalia
"suggests that we look to the practices and interpretations of the Founding
generation(s), implying that what counts most are the.., understandings of
those reasonably educated men who were around when the relevant provisions
were adopted."
Accordingly, originalism counsels in favor of an objective
inquiry that emphasizes "original understanding, not original intent,"
and
154
reads "texts reasonably and naturally for all that they fairly contain."'
The pragmatic interpretation theory differs starkly from originalism, and
strives to decide cases based upon the implications that such decisions will have
as a matter of public policy.1t 5 Simply stated, the pragmatic theory maintains
that courts should try to reach the best, that is, the most just and fair, result in
each case.156 Indeed, Justice Breyer emphasizes that courts need to pay
"attention to practical consequences of government decisions, ' 57 which suggests
a broader, and perhaps more activist, type of judicial review.

147. Richard B. Saphire, Constitutional Predispositions, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 277, 281
(1998) (quoting Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 13 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)).
148. See id. (quoting Scalia, supra note 147, at 22).
149. Id. at 281 (quoting Scalia, supra note 147, at 23).
150. Id. at 281-82 (quoting Scalia, supra note 147, at 29) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. See James E. Ryan, Book Review: Does It Take a Theory? Originalism, Active Liberty,
and Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1623, 1628 (2006). As Ryan explains, originalists believe that
courts "should ... determine how the [Constitution's] provisions were understood at the time they
were ratified, and that understanding should guide decisions." Id. at 1624 (citing Scalia, supra note
147, at 38).
152. Id. at 1628-29 (citing Scalia, supra note 147, at 38; Antonin Scalia, Response, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra note 147, at 135-36;
Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856-63 (1989)).
153. Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of
Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friendof CriminalDefendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 186 (2005).
154. Id. (citing Scalia, supra note 147, at 38).
155. See Ryan, supra note 151, at 1626 (citing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 3-34 (2005)).
156. See id. (citing BREYER, supra note 155).
157. Id. (citing BREYER, supra note 155).
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Importantly, however, Justice Breyer does not reject originalism--or any
other theory-as an interpretive paradigm. 158 Instead, he neither advocates nor
relies upon a single theory to guide constitutional decision making. 159 This is
due in significant part to the fact that "some of [the Constitution's] provisions
are open-ended and do not provide clear directions for rules of action, and
16 one
cannot easily ascertain a precisely defined purpose behind the provisions."' 0
Ultimately, the pragmatic theory of interpretation is viewed as "creating a
form of government in which all citizens share the government's authority,
participating in the creation of public policy.' ' 161 In essence, Justice Breyer
"believes that reference to this purpose, along with attention to the practical
consequences of judicial decisions, can lead the Court to better results."' 62 In so
doing, the Court "will yield better law-law that helps a community of
find practical solutions to important contemporary
individuals democratically
1 63
social problems."

Minimalism, an approach endorsed and advocated by Cass Sunstein, 164 does
not favor any specific theory of interpretation.' 65 Instead, minimalism advocates
a more modest form of judicial review, and does not "want any more than [to]
decide one case at a time." 166 In essence, minimalists "want to 'avoid taking
stands on the biggest and most contested questions of constitutional law,' and
instead believe that more modest answers can be achieved through 'incompletely
theorized agreements. ' 167 To be sure, "[tjhese agreements leave fundamental
questions undecided and consist of a consensus forged around reasonable
outcomes that can 'attract support from people holding many different
theoretical positions.""' 68 In others words, "minimalists support reasonable
public policies, and they favor the Court acting in as gingerly a fashion as
possible to foster those policies." 69
Finally, pluralistic methods of interpretation are inherently self-defining, as
they "hold that there are multiple legitimate methods of interpreting the
Constitution."'' 70 Indeed, because the Constitution "is a complex document
consisting of many clauses, each of varying degrees of generality and

158. See id. at 1642.
159. See id. (citing BREYER, supra note 155, at 7).
160. Id. (citing BREYER, supra note 155, at 18-19).
161. Id. (quoting BREYER, supra note 155, at 33) (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting BREYER, supra note 155, at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. Id. at 1648.
165. Id. (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING
COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 27 (2005)).
166. Id. (citing SUNSTEIN, supra note 165).
167. ld. (quoting SUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 27-28).
168. Id. (quoting SUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 28).
169. Id. at 1653.
170. Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1753,
1753 (1994).
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ambiguity,"' 171 it seems logical to employ "a variety of principles or interpretive
methods ...when interpreting a complex document such as the Constitution.172
Those advocating a pluralist theory of interpretation assert that "close scrutiny of
the text of the Constitution, determination of the intent of the Framers,
application of precedent, examination of the structure of the Constitution, and
appeals to a national ethos or tradition,"'173 are all relevant considerations.
Given these methods, the question then becomes: What interpretive
framework will be most effective in effectuating a model of restraint while
simultaneously safeguarding the basic rights to which all citizens are entitled?
More specifically, it is important to determine what method or methods will best
promote judicial restraint under the Fourteenth Amendment while ensuring equal
treatment and liberty under the Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses. Before answering this question, however, the Court should abolish the
substantive due process doctrine so that the doctrine no longer plays a part in the
Court's jurisprudence.
Second, the Equal Protection Clause, which is designed to174 address
sol
legislation that differentiates or discriminates among various groups, should
command two standards of review. First, the three-tiered analysis must be
abandoned.
Next, because discrimination is so anathema to the Constitution, this is the
area where the Court should take its most active role. This dimension is where
the Court will undertake to protect equal rights, not invent or create "new"
rights. Thus, the proper method of interpretation would be pragmatism and
pluralism. Here, the Court must employ searching scrutiny in assessing the
purpose underlying particular legislation, and decide whether the differentiation
is necessary and justifiable using the six-part standard advocated in this Article.
In so doing, it must also determine whether other, less restrictive remedies would
have been appropriate and whether the state has considered such measures.
Finally, the state should have the burden of demonstrating whether the
legislation, even if facially neutral, is likely to lead to a substantially disparate
impact. Importantly, though, when the legislature passes a social or economic
issue that is applicable to all citizens, the Court should act with restraint,
adopting a minimalist policy that is highly deferential to the legislature.
Finally, when applying and interpreting the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the Court must be careful not to transform the clause into another
substantive due process doctrine by simply switching its activist role to another

171. Id. at 1756.
172. Id.

173. Id. at 1768. Griffin does acknowledge that "these methods can point in different
directions in any given case, but resolving this problem is not an appropriate task for a general
theory of constitutional interpretation." Id.
174. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("The central purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct
discriminating on the basis of race.").
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part of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, the Court should be extraordinarily
careful not to create new rights, or declare certain rights fundamental that have
no basis in the Constitution. Instead, the Court should adopt a minimalist
approach, and show great deference to state legislatures and the democratic
process, as these are the fora by which policies should be debated, instituted, and
changed. This is especially true when the Court considers an issue that a
legislature has not yet acted upon or considered. In such a case, the Court should
either not grant certiorari or proceed with a minimalist approach that leaves the
issue open to the voters, public debate, and the electorate's representatives.
As set forth below, the Court has failed to perform this function in some of
the most important cases of the twentieth century, and has instead acted
according to its policy predilections. In other words, on some of the most critical
social issues in this country's histo 7 , the Court, and not the individual state
legislatures, has decided the issue.iV A review of some of the most seminal
cases illustrates this misguided approach. After a review of these cases, an
example of a current issue-gay rights-that applies this Article's proposal will
be provided to illustrate how the Court should reach more modest and
institutionally justifiable decisions.
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS DOCTRINE: THE RIGHT DECISIONS, THE
WRONG DECISIONS, AND ABOLISHING THE INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK

Perhaps the most profound mistake in the Court's modem day jurisprudence
was its creation of the substantive due process doctrine. The Court invented new
rights, stripped the legislature of its lawmaking power, and compromised the
democratic process. As set forth below, the Court held, among other things, that
the Due Process Clause contained substantive privacy and liberty interests that
emanated from the clause, even though they emanated more from the Justices'
thinking than the language of the clause itself. An examination of some of the
most important cases in the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence is set
forth below.
1. Griswold v. Connecticut
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 76 Connecticut enacted a statute prohibiting the
use of contraceptives by any person, whether married or single.17 In applying

175. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154, 163-64 (1973) (a woman's right to
terminate a pregnancy during the first trimester); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972)
(right of unmarried person to use contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1965) (right to marital privacy).
176. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Importantly, both Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), arguably represent the beginning of the Court's
substantive due process jurisprudence. However, their holdings do not contain the type of farreaching and unprecedented readings of the Due Process Clause that later cases set forth. In Meyer,
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the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court found the
statute unconstitutional. 178 The Court held that there is a right of personal
privacy recognized under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. 179 In finding a substantive right of privacy in the Due Process
Clause, the Court stated that there are "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights

[that] have penumbras, formed
180 by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance."'
Griswold was wrongly decided and had no legal basis whatsoever. First, the
Court was wrong when it discovered a right to privacy under the Due Process
Clause. There is nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause that could

possibly be construed to confer such a right, as it only strives to create fair

the state enacted a law prohibiting the teaching of any language other than English in primary
school. 262 U.S. at 396-97. The Plaintiff schoolteacher taught a course in German and was
convicted under this law. Id. The Court reversed the conviction, holding that:
[While it] has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed,. . . it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but.., the right of
the individual to contract,... to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children. . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id. at 399 (citations omitted). In Pierce, the State of Oregon enacted a criminal statute requiring
parents to send their children to public school in the district in which the child resided. 268 U.S. at
530. The plaintiff-appellees, private educational institutions, sought to enjoin the act in order to
protect their enrollment. Id. at 531-33. The Court found the statute unconstitutional, holding that it
"interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing ...of children under
their control." Id. at 534-35. In addition, the Court held that the concept of liberty "excludes any
general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only." Id. at 535. While these cases were critical in discussing the liberty interests
that lie within the Constitution, they did not specifically connect them to the Due Process Clause,
and thus are somewhat attenuated from the Court's core substantive due process jurisprudence. See
also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that a statute
authorizing the sterilization of males convicted of two or more felonies involving moral turpitude
was unconstitutional largely because marriage and procreation were basic liberties secured by the
Constitution).
177. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (West 1963) invalidatedby
Griswold, 381 U.S. 479).
178. Id. at 485-86.
179. Id. at 481,485.
180. Id. at 484. The Court's conclusion was also buttressed by way of analogy to the First
Amendment:
The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of
Rights. The right to educate a child in a school of the parents' choice-whether public or
private or parochial-is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to study any particular
subject or any foreign language. Yet the First Amendment has been construed to include
certain of those rights.
...The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to
print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, to right to read, and freedom of
inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach ....Without those peripheral rights
the specific rights would be less secure.
Id. at 482-83 (citations omitted).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2011

25

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 3

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63: 285

procedures before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property.181 Of course,
this does not mean that there is no right to privacy in the Constitution; certainly,
that right inheres in the Fourth Amendment, where individuals generally cannot
be subject to a search or seizure without probable cause.IS2 However, a privacy
right cannot possibly be construed in the Due Process Clause. Furthermore, the
Court's statement that there exist "penumbras" and "emanations"' 3 in the
Constitution may, at best, be a reasonable statement where a provision is
ambiguous or overly general. The Due Process Clause, however, is anything but
ambiguous-it protects procedural, not substantive rights. Ultimately, while the
statute in question in Griswold was quite strange and imprudent, it was for the
voters, not the Court, to effectuate change.
2.

Eisenstadt v. Baird

In Eisenstadt v. Baird,184 Massachusetts enacted a statute prohibiting nonmarried couples from obtaining contraception. 85 The Court found that the
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, 86 thereby extending Griswold's
right to privacy to unmarried couples. Specifically, the Court explained that "[i]f
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." 187 The Court also rejected morality as a sufficient basis for the legislation
because it would mean that "persons must risk for themselves an unwanted
pregnancy" and, such a policy would conflict "with fundamental human
rights.""
The Court correctly invalidated the statute on Equal Protection grounds,
although the expansion of Griswold's privacy interest had no constitutional basis
whatsoever. Massachusetts's statute discriminated, or differentiated, between
married and unmarried couples. 89 The underlying reason for allowing married
couples to use contraception was so that they could avoid unwanted
pregnancies.19 0 Ironically, by prohibiting contraceptives to unmarried couples,
the statute would likely create what it sought to prevent, because the risk of

181. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
182. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct.
2633, 2639 (2009).
183. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
184. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
185. Id. at 440-41 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 21 and 21A (West 1966), invalidated
by Eisenstadt,405 U.S. 438).
186. Id. at 454-55.
187. Id. at 453.
188. Id. at 452-53 (quoting Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1402 (1st Cir. 1970)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
189. See id. at 442.
190. See id.
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unwanted pregnancy for unmarried couples would be substantially increased.
While the state attempted to put forth a justification based on morality,191 it was
simply unrealistic, because the effects of the law would lead precisely to what it
believed was immoral conduct. The statute was correctly struck down on Equal
Protection grounds.
3. Roe v. Wade
In what might be the worst decision in recent history, the Court, in Roe v.
192
Wade, invalidated a Texas statute which criminalized all abortions except
those necessary to save the life of the mother. 93 The Court found the statute
unconstitutional, holding that the privacy interest in the Due Process Clause
encompassed a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy during the first
trimester.' 94 Thus, in the first trimester, a woman could terminate a life, or a
potential life, entirely free from state interference. 195 Significantly, the Court
expanded on the right of privacy by stating that it was based196 also on a
Clause.
substantive notion of "liberty" contained in the Due Process
In essence, the Court held, without any justification, that the right of privacy
"is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy."' 97 Next, the Court unilaterally abandoned any pretension of
legal analysis and opted to legislate from the bench by determining when a state
may properly enact restrictions limiting a woman's right to an abortion. 98 It
singlehandedly determined, without any legal basis, that a woman's right to
terminate a pregnancy during the first trimester, which the Court declared to be
the point of viability,199 outweighed the state's interest in prenatal life and the
health of the mother. 2°° For the Court, the state's enactment of regulations
beyond the point of viability, such as the qualifications and licensure of the
person performing the abortion, were proper
,,201 then presumably
. • because "the fetus
•
Thus,
has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb.
concerns about the preservation of maternal and fetal ..health
, ,202 came into
. . . . only
existence once the state had a "logical and biological justification[] .
This is one of the worst decisions in Supreme Court history and an example
of judicial overreaching and lack of restraint. If ever there was a sensitive social

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See id. at 452-53.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 164.
See id. at 154, 163-64.
See id. at 164.
See id. at 152-53.
Id. at 153.
See id. at 155, 163-64.
Id. at 163.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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issue that was within the purview of the states' legislative authority, this was the
textbook example. The voters of Texas, through their representatives, made
decisions concerning their moral beliefs in terms of when life begins, the value
and respect for life, and the respect that is to be given to unborn children. With
such a sensitive issue, its resolution, and the secondary issues related thereto,
should have been left to the various state legislatures and resolved through public
debate and the democratic process. The Court's complete usurpation of, and
disregard for, the separation of powers was startling. Not only did the Court
again rely on a privacy interest that is nowhere to be found in the Due Process
Clause, but it compounded this problem by arbitrarily deciding when it was
proper for the state to intervene. The Court declared that viability occurs at "the
compelling point" because it was only at that time that the child was capable, in
the Court's view, of meaningful life. 203 Nothing could be more incredulous-it
is the states' prerogative to determine the meaning and value of life, not nine
unelected and unaccountable judges. Roe was a highly questionable decision
and set a dangerous precedent. Hopefully, the use of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause as part of the three-part solution will avoid the mistakes of
cases like Roe, and counsel in favor of restraint.
4. Bowers v. Hardwick
In Bowers v. Hardwick,204 the petitioners, a homosexual couple, mounted an
as-applied challenge to a law that criminalized consensual sodomy. 2°5 The Court
found the statute constitutional, 2° 6 and in this instance, framed the due process
inquiry differently. Instead of relying upon privacy and liberty interests, the
Court framed the issue as whether the Constitution "confers a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy" and thus "invalidates the laws of the
many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long
time.'2°7 The Court held that the Due Process Clause did not encompass a right
to homosexual sodomy, explaining that, while it protects the right to child
rearing, procreation, marriage, contraception, and abortion, homosexuality was
far too attenuated from the rights previously recognized. 20 8 The Court also
rejected the concept that any kind of private, consensual sexual conduct between
adults
was free
from state
the Court
thatconsidered
a right to
homosexual
sodomy
could regulation.
not be held Finally,
to fall under
thoseheld
rights

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 190.
See id. at 190-91 (citations omitted).
Id. at 191.
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"'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'
such that 'neither liberty nor justice
210
would exist if [they] were sacrificed."'
Bowers was correctly decided. The Court rightly held that the Due Process
Clause did not encompass a right to homosexual sodomy. There is nothing in
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment that could even remotely support this
proposition. Furthermore, the Court exercised restraint and modesty in refusing
to find, within the judicially created privacy and liberty interests, a fundamental
right to consensual sodomy. As the Court held, neither the history nor traditions
of this country supported recognition of such a right, and any such recognition
would risk placing judicial predilection above the unambiguous mandate of the
Constitution. 211 Perhaps more importantly, it would have taken important
matters of social policy outside of the legislative arena and democratic processes
where the Constitution envisioned that they be debated and, ultimately, the
source of positive law. The Court's decision was correct as a matter of law and
consistent with its role in constitutional decision making.

5. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health
In Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of Health,212 the parents of co-

petitioner, Nancy Cruzan, who sustained severe injuries in an automobile
accident and was in a persistent vegetative state, sought to terminate her artificial
nutrition and hydration in order to end her life.
The Supreme Court of
Missouri rejected this request because, pursuant to a state statute governing the
withdrawal of medical treatment, there was not clear and convincing evidence
from Cruzan herself that, if ever in a vegetative state, she would wish to
discontinue such treatment.2 14 The issue presented was whether an individual
"has a right under the United States Constitution which would require the
hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under these
circumstances.

215

The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Missouri statute requiring that
certain procedural requirements be met before a party could withdraw the lifesustaining treatment of a patient in a vegetative state.
It began its analysis by
acknowledging that "[iut cannot be disputed that the Due Process Clause protects
an interest ... in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment." 21 7 However, the
determination that a person "has a 'liberty interest' under the Due Process Clause

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
banc)).
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-95.
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Id. at 265-68.
See id. at 268-69 (citing Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424-26 (Mo. 1988) (en
Id. at 269.
See id. at 280.
Id. at 281.
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does not end the inquiry; 'whether respondent's constitutional rights have been
violated must be determined
by balancing his liberty interests against the
2 18
relevant state interests.'
In finding in favor of the State, the Court did so upon grounds that arguably
did not infringe on the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. The Court
stated that the "United States Constitution would grant a competent person' 2 a9
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition. 1
However, because Cruzan was in a vegetative state, she was not able to "make
an informed and voluntary choice" to exercise her constitutional right to refuse
medical treatment. 220 As a result, "[s]uch a 'right' must be exercised221for her, if
at all, by some sort of surrogate," which, in this case, was her parents.
Thus, because Cruzan was unable to express her own wishes, the Court held
that Missouri's statute, which required Cruzan's parents to demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that she would have wanted to refuse the lifesaving
medical treatment, was constitutionally permissible. 222 The Court found that
Missouri had an important interest in "the protection and preservation of human
life," and was not required "to remain neutral in the face of an informed and
voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to death. ,,223 Indeed,
because "[t]he choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision of
obvious and overwhelming finality," the state "may legitimately seek to
safeguard the personal element of this choice through the imposition of
heightened evidentiary requirements. 224
Cruzan was correctly decided, and remains an important case in providing
states with the authority to make decisions concerning life, its quality, and its
termination. While the Court erred in finding that the right to refuse medical
treatment could somehow be divined from the Due Process Clause, the Court
was correct in holding in this case that the state's interest in life itself was
paramount to the individual's interest in its termination. Stated differently, the

218. Id. at 279 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)) (footnote omitted).
219. Id. (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 280.
221. Id. In finding Missouri's statute constitutional, the Court held as follows:
An incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise
a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other fight .... Here, Missouri has in
effect recognized that under certain circumstances a surrogate may act for the patient in
electing to have hydration and nutrition withdrawn in such a way as to cause death, but it
has established a procedural safeguard to assure that the action of the surrogate conforms
as best it may to the wishes expressed by the patient while competent. Missouri requires
that evidence of the incompetent's wishes as to the withdrawal of treatment be proved by
clear and convincing evidence. The question, then, is whether the United States
Constitution forbids the establishment of this procedural requirement by the State. We
hold that it does not.
Id.
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 281.
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approach and gave
decision was correct because the Court
, ... adopted a minimalist
. 225
due deference to the state's interest in the preservation of life. This interest is,
and should be, a matter of state governance, not judicial lawmaking. Thus,
Cruzan, while not necessarily analogous to Roe, at least provided the states with
a small degree of deference concerning decisions that arguably could be regarded
as within the province of individual autonomy.
6. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
In Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,226 the Court

returned to applying the Due Process Clause's liberty and privacy interests to a
case involving, at the very least, potential life. 22 The petitioners challenged
several provisions of a state statute, which placed various limitations and
regulations on the ability to obtain an abortion. 228 Specifically, the statute (1)
required a woman to give informed consent prior to the procedure, (2) mandated
the informed consent of a parent in the event that a minor was seeking an
abortion, although there was a judicial bypass procedure, (3) required a married
woman seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of her husband, (4) provided a
"medical emergency" exception that exempted a woman from any of the
foregoing requirements, and (5) imposed certain reporting requirements on
facilities providing abortion services.
In rendering its decision, the Court upheld the core holding of Roe, as well
as the privacy and liberty interests that underscored its decision. 23° The Court
recognized "the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State.' ' 231 In
support of this holding, the Court explained that "protection of the woman's
decision to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment ....The controlling word... is 'liberty.' ' '232 The
concept of liberty means, at its very core, "a promise of the Constitution that
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter," and the
"substantive liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment" are not limited to
"those recognized by the Bill of Rights," or to those that "were protected against
government[al] interference.., when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified. ' 233 In other words, the liberty and privacy interests guaranteed by the

225.
(1996).
226.
227.
228.
(1990)).
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 94
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
See id. at 846.
Id. at 844-45 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3205, 3206, 3209, 3207(b), 3214(a), 3214(f)
2
Id. at 844 (citing §§ 3205, 3206, 3209, 3207(b), 3 14(a), 3214(f)).
See id. at 846.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 847.
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Fourteenth Amendment were not limited to "those rights already guaranteed to
the individual against federal interference" 234 or in the "precise
terms of the
' 235
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution.
Therefore, the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause "is not a series of
isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of
speech, press, and religion ... and so on," but rather, it is a "rational continuum
which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints."' 236 Ultimately, due process "has not been
reduced to any formula,, 237 and instead reflects the "traditions from which it
developed as well as the traditions from which
it broke. ' ' 238 Under all
239
circumstances, that tradition "is a living thing."

Casey was wrongly decided and nearly as destructive as Roe. Perhaps most
troubling is that the Court again relied upon its abstract notion of liberty and
privacy to extract the right to terminate a pregnancy from a clause that seeks
merely to ensure fair processes. Casey represents a ruling that has strayed so far
from the text and meaning of the Due Process Clause that the Court is no longer
just legislating from the bench, but is now also not following the language of the
Constitution in its rulings. 240 Instead, it is importing its contemporary policy
notions into a document that is simply not designed for that type of change,
policy-making, and evolution that the Court arguably seeks. Indeed, unlike
Cruzan, the Court's expansive and wide-ranging dicta suggest its willingness to
find more rights under the Due Process Clause without any deference to the
legislative process.
The Constitution is designed to provide a structural framework to serve as
the basis upon which to guarantee certain basic rights, and then leave to the
legislature the task of expanding these rights as the people see fit through their
elected representatives. For the Court to admit that the Constitution is a "living
thing ' ' 241 that contains "substantive liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment" 242 is to acknowledge that it is departing from the very document to
which it claims fidelity.

234. Id.
235. Id. at 848 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
236. Id. (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
237. Id. at 849 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
238. Id. at 850 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
239. Id. (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
240. See id. at 980 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Constitution says "absolutely
nothing" about a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy).
241. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542) (internal quotation marks omitted).
242. Id. at 847.
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7. Washington v. Glucksberg
In Washington v. Glucksberg,243 the Court confronted the issue of whether
the liberty interest under the Due Process Clause 2rotects the right of assisted
The State of Washington
suicide for, among others, terminally ill patients.
enacted a statute providing that "[a] person is guilty of promoting a suicide
245
attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide."
However, the statute did provide that the "withholding or withdrawal246of lifesustaining treatment.. . shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide."
In upholding the statute, the Court held that the Due Process Clause does not
encompass a fundamental right to assisted suicide.247 The Court's analysis
focused on the notion that the Due Process Clause "specially protects those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition.' 248 Using this standard, the Court explained that
"[in almost every State-indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is a
crime to assist a suicide. . . . [,and] assisted-suicide bans are ....longstanding
expressions of the States' commitment to the protection and preservation of all
human life." 249
In fact, "opposition to and condemnation of suicide-and, therefore, of
assisting suicide-are consistent and enduring themes of our philosophical,
legal, and cultural heritages. 250 Furthermore, "for over 700 years, the AngloAmerican common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both
suicide and assisting suicide.' 25 1 Simply stated, "[t]he history of the law's
treatment of assisted suicide in this country has been and continues to be one of
''252
Accordingly, in part due to the
the rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it.
"consistent and almost universal tradition ',253 against permitting assisted suicide,
the Court concluded that assisted suicide
254 was "not a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause."
Glucksberg was correctly decided, and was more in line with the modest role
that the Court should assume and the interpretive model-minimalism-to
which it should subscribe. There is nothing whatsoever in the Constitution that

243. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
244. See id. at 705-06, 708 (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454,
1459 (W.D.Wash. 1994)).
245. Id. at 707 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1) (1994)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
246. Id. at 717 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.070(1) (1994)).
247. Id. at 728.
248. Id. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
249. Id. at 710 (footnote omitted) (citing Cruzan v.Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
280 (1990)).
250. Id.at 711.
concurring)).
251. Id.(citing Cruzan, 497 U.S.at 294-95 (Scalia, J.,
252. Id.at728.
253. Id.at 723.
254. Id.at 728.
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could possibly sanction a right to assisted suicide. While the Court relied upon
history and tradition, it could have also used this case to eviscerate the
substantive due process doctrine. Certainly, based upon Roe and Casey, it could
be argued that physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill would constitute a
proper exercise of the Due Process Clause's liberty and privacy interests. This
case, therefore, would have been an ideal opportunity to cast doubt upon those
concepts and return constitutional decision making to its proper roleinterpreting the text and the intentions of the Framers and, in most cases, making
incremental decisions that leave critical policy issues to the legislature.
8. Lawrence v. Texas
In Lawrence v. Texas, 255 the Court was again faced with an issue concerning
the constitutionality of a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy
between consenting adults.256 In Lawrence, the Court not only took the
extraordinary step of invalidating the statute and overturning Bowers, but it also
fundamentally re-framed its substantive due process analysis.25 7 First, the Court
held that the Bowers majority erred when it formulated the due process inquiry
as whether the Constitution "confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy." 258 Specifically, the Court explained that "[t]he laws
involved in Bowers and here are... statutes that purport to do no more than
prohibit a particular sexual act," but their "penalties and purposes ...have more
far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct,
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.'259 The Court
found this constitutionally impermissible, stating that "[w]hen sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but
one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected
' 26 by
the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice. 0
Importantly, the Court's holding also re-shaped the due process inquiry
when determining whether newly asserted rights are entitled to constitutional
protection. Specifically, while the Court did examine the nation's history and
tradition with respect to homosexual conduct, 261 it stated that "[h]istory and
tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the
substantive due process inquiry. ' 262 In so doing, the Court held that "our laws

255. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
256. Id. at 562-63.
257. See id. at 577-79.
258. Id. at 566 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
259. Id. at 567.
260. Id.
261. Id.at 568-72 (citations omitted).
262. Id. at 572 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here. ' 263 Using this
framework, the Court stated that "[t]hese references show an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." 264 In fact, the
Court relied upon the language in Casey to hold that matters "central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. ,265 Indeed, "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
,2 6
life.
The Court's holding, however, went further. It stated that the recognition of
new fundamental rights that reflect greater and more contemporary notions of
freedom would continue to be part of the Court's jurisprudence. 267 As the
majority stated, "Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components 268
of
specific."
more
been
have
might
they
possibilities,
manifold
its
in
liberty
However, the Founders "did not presume to have this insight," and were aware
that "times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws
once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the
Constitution endures, persons in every
269 generation can invoke its principles in
their own search for greater freedom."
Lawrence was correctly decided, but for the wrong reason, as the Court
again incorrectly relied on the Due Process Clause in reaching its holding.
Instead of employing this ghastly approach, the Court should have based its
ruling upon the Equal Protection Clause, as the statute was clearly
unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds. It again discriminated against
homosexuals by criminalizing homosexual sodomy, while permitting
heterosexuals to engage in precisely the same act. 27 This is intentional
discrimination, and the statute should have been declared unconstitutional on this
basis. Of course, had it outlawed sodomy to both heterosexuals and
homosexuals, the result may have been different. 271 Ultimately, as much as it
should not, the Court will continue to adjudicate cases involving fundamental
rights, social issues, and important matters related to liberty and privacy.

263. Id. at 571-72.
264. Id. at 572.
265. Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
266. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851) (internal quotation marks omitted).
267. See id. at 578-79.
268. Id. at 578.
269. Id. at 578-79.
270. Id. at 581 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
271. See id. at 584.
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For example, the issue of gay rights is currently a very divisive and
contentious matter in public debate 272 and continues to be litigated in the
273

courts . 2

Therefore, the Court may eventually be confronted with the issue of

whether gay marriage is a fundamental right under the Constitution. Using the
three-part solution proposed in this Article, it will be shown how the Court, as
well as lower courts, should approach and decide this issue, as well as other
rights-based cases. By analyzing those decisions that have already been decided
concerning gay rights, the three-part solution can provide a proper foundation for
the Court.
RIGHTS, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE: APPLICATION OF THE THREE-PART

IV. GAY

PROPOSAL

The contentious issue of gay rights, particularly gay marriage, has been the
subject274of passionate and divisive litigation in both the state and federal
Apart from the issue of whether this matter should be resolved through
courts.
the democratic process rather than the courts, several cases highlight the
constitutional bases upon which gay marriage has been recognized or rejected.
These decisions provide a basis upon which to distinguish between improvident
decisions and those where the courts maintain restraint and fidelity to their
judicial function.
A.

Baker v. State

In Baker v. State, same sex couples instituted a suit for declaratory
judgment, alleging that the refusal to issue them marriage licenses violated
Vermont's state constitution.275 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the State
violated the common benefits clause of Vermont's constitution, 276 which
provides in relevant part as follows: "That government is, or ought to be,
instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation

272. See Carlos E. GonzAlez, The 2006 David J. Stouffer Lecture: Statutory Interpretation:
Looking Back. Looking Forward., 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 703, 706-07 (2006) ("Even today and even
in the blue states, granting homosexual life partners the same bundle of legal rights granted to
heterosexual married couples is a contentious subject.").
273. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (whether a
state constitutional amendment limiting valid marriage as one between a man and a woman was
permitted under the Federal Constitution).
274. See, e.g., Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006) (examining
the constitutionality of a state prohibition on same-sex marriage); Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921
(same); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (same); Lewis v. Harris,
908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (same); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (same).
275. Baker, 744 A.2d. at 867-68.
276. Id. at 869-70 (citing VT. CONST.ch. I, art. 7 (1786)).
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or community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single
person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that community ....
In essence, Vermont's common benefits clause is equivalent to, yet
somewhat broader than, the federal Equal Protection Clause.2 8 In challenging
the ban on same-sex marriage, the plaintiffs argued that the law deprived them of
many legal benefits, including, inter alia, access to a spouse's life, medical, and
hospital visitation, spousal support, and intestate
disability 27insurance,
9
succession.

The court began its analysis by recognizing that, while the Equal Protection
Clause was its federal counterpart, it was free to "provide more generous
protection to rights under the Vermont Constitution."' 280 The court then
explained that for cases involving the common benefits clause of the Vermont
constitution, the "legislative classifications must 'reasonably relate to a
legitimate public purpose.'' 281 In addition, "the justifications demanded of the
State may depend upon the nature and importance of the benefits and protections
282
affected by the legislation; indeed, this is implicit in the weighing process.,
Put differently, the common benefits clause "require[s] a 'more stringent'
reasonableness inquiry than was generally associated with rational basis review
under the federal constitution. 28 While noting that "our task is to distill the
essence, motivating ideal of the framers," the court also would address
"contemporary issues that the framers undoubtedly could never have
' 284
imagined.
Against this backdrop, the court found that Vermont's ban on same-sex
marriage contravened the common benefits clause and was therefore
unconstitutional. 285 First, the court was not persuaded by the State's justification
that "excluding same-sex couples from the legal benefits of marriage" advances
286
the interest in "further[ing] the link between procreation and child rearing.'
The State claimed that it had an interest in "promoting a permanent commitment
between couples who have children to ensure that their offspring are considered
legitimate and receive ongoing parental support." 287 In other words, the State
sought to support marriage through sending "a public message that procreation
and child rearing are intertwined."

277.
278.
279.
280.
omitted).
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7 (1786).
See Baker, 744 A.2d at 870.
Id.
Id. (quoting State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 347 (Vt. 1982)) (internal quotation marks
id. at 871 (quoting Choquette v. Perrault, 569 A.2d 455, 459 (Vt. 1989)).
Id.
Id. (quoting State v. Brunelle, 534 A.2d 198, 201-02 (Vt. 1987)).
Id. at 874.
id. at 889.
Id. at 881 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
/d.(internal quotation marks omitted).
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In rejecting this argument, the court stated that "many opposite-sex couples
marry for reasons unrelated to procreation, that some of these couples never
289
intend to have children, and that others are incapable of having children."
Accordingly, if the State's purpose is to promote procreation and child rearing,
then the law "is significantly underinclusive." 29° In other words, "[t]he law
extends the benefits and protections of marriage to many persons with no logical
,,291
Furthermore, "[T]here is no
connection to the stated governmental goal. '
dispute that a significant number of children.., are actually being raised by
conceived
same-sex parents, and that increasing numbers of children are being 292
by such parents through a variety of assisted-reproductive techniques."
Thus, "[W]ith or without the marriage sanction, the reality today is that
increasing numbers of same-sex couples are employing increasingly efficient
293
assisted-reproductive techniques to conceive and raise children."
Accordingly, to the extent that the State's interest was to provide security for
who are no different from
children, the State excludes "many same-sex couples 294
opposite-sex couples with respect to these objectives.
The State's next argument was that "because same-sex couples cannot
conceive a child on their own, their exclusion promotes a 'perception of the link
between procreation and child rearing. ' ' ' 295 In rejecting this claim, the court
explained that "most of those who utilize nontraditional means of conception are
infertile married couples ...and that many assisted-reproductive techniques
involve only one of the married partner's genetic material, the other being
Indeed,
supplied by a third party through sperm, egg, or embryo donation."
"The State does not suggest that the use of these technologies undermines a
married couple's sense of parental responsibility ...[and it does not] even
remotely suggest that access to such techniques ought to be restricted ....
By finding the State's claims unavailing, the court held that "[t]he legal benefits
and protections flowing from a marriage license are of such significance that any
statutory exclusion must necessarily be grounded on public concerns of
sufficient weight, cogency, and authority that the justice of the deprivation
cannot seriously be questioned. '' 298 Ultimately, due to the "extreme logical
disjunction between the classification and the stated purposes of the lawprotecting children and 'furthering the link between procreation and child
rearing'-the exclusion falls substantially short of this standard., 299 In finding a

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 882.
Id.
Id.
Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 884.
299. Id.
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violation of the common benefits clause, the court left to the legislature whether
to amend the statute or create a domestic partnership statute providing the
benefits attendant to marriage. 3°
Baker was rightly decided. The court was correct because it did not create
new rights or unjustifiably expand on already recognized rights. Instead, it
examined the issue of discriminatory treatment under what is analogous to, albeit
broader than, the Equal Protection Clause. 3° 1 In so doing, the court correctly
found that the state's objectives could not justify the differential treatment as the
evidence did not support the notion that the ban would achieve the purported
governmental objective. 3 02 Additionally, in finding the ban constitutionally
infirm, the court acted with restraint-it did not require the legislature to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, but instead left it to the legislature to
determine whether it could enact a civil union law that would provide the same
benefits and privileges as marriage itself.3°3 By intimating that such a law would
survive constitutional scrutiny, 304 the court acted modestly while preserving the
plaintiff s constitutional rights.
B. Perry v. Schwarzenegger
In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 305 the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality
of a voter-enacted constitutional amendment that defined marriage as between
306
one man and one woman.

In determining whether the statute passed

constitutional muster,
the court focused upon the Due Process and Equal
30 7

Protection Clauses.

To begin with, the court held that the amendment violated the plaintiffs'
fundamental right to marriage. 308 As the court explained, "The freedom to marry
'3
is recognized as a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause.
The court then stated that "[tihe question presented here is whether plaintiffs
seek to exercise the fundamental right to marry; or, because310they are couples of
the same sex, whether they seek recognition of a new right."
The court started this analysis by recognizing that "[t]o determine whether a
right is fundamental under the Due Process Clause, the court inquires into
whether the right is rooted 'in our Nation's history, legal traditions, and

300. See id,at 886.
301. See id. at 870.
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See id.
305. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
306. Id. at 927 (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (West 2002), invalidated by Perry, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921).
307. See id. at 991,995.
308. See id. at 991.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 992.
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practices.
Based on this framework, the court noted that "[m]arriage has
retained certain characteristics throughout the history of the United States. [It]
requires two parties to give their free consent to form a relationship, which then
forms the foundation of a household. ' ,312 Additionally, "spouses must consent to
support each other and any dependents [and t]he state regulates marriage because
marriage creates stable households, which in turn form the basis of a stable,
governable populace." 3 13 Furthermore, "Never has the state inquired into
procreative capacity or intent before issuing a marriage license; indeed, a
marriage license is more than a license to have procreative sexual
intercourse." 314 Rather, "wholly apart from procreation, choice and privacy play
a pivotal role in the marital relationship. ' 315 Thus, the essence of marriage "has
been historically and remains the right to choose a spouse and, with mutual
consent, join together and form a household. '

316

On this basis, the court held

that the plaintiffs "do not seek recognition of a new right," instead, "plaintiffs
31 7
ask California to recognize their relationships for what they are: marriages."
Accordingly, "Because plaintiffs seek to exercise their fundamental right to
marry, their claim is subject to strict scrutiny." 318 Thus, the State had the burden
of demonstrating that the amendment was "narrowly tailored to a compelling
government interest." 319 The court held that the State had not proffered any
reasons that could justify a ban on same-sex marriages. 320 For example, it
rejected the State's argument that marriage was traditionally understood to be
between a man and a woman. 321 The court also found unpersuasive the State's
argument that, on sensitive social issues such as this, the court should proceed
incrementally to decrease "the probability of the potential adverse consequences
of same-sex marriage. ' 322 In response, the court held that there was no credible
evidence that32same-sex
marriage would have deleterious effects on marriage or
3
society itself.
In addition, the court found meritless the State's assertion that it had an
interest in promoting opposite-sex parenting over raising children by same-sex
couples. 324 Specifically, the court replied by holding that "the evidence shows
beyond any doubt that parents' genders are irrelevant to children's

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997)).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
id.
Id.
Id. at 993.
Id.
Id. at 994 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978)).
Id. at 995 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977)).
See id. at 998-1002.
Id. at 998.
Id. 998-99.
See id. at 999.
See id. at 1000.
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developmental outcomes." 325 The court also noted that the amendment
"prevents same-sex couples from marrying," not from adopting or raising
children. 326 Moreover, when same-sex couples "can have (or adopt) and raise
children...
they are treated identically to opposite-sex parents under California
327
law."

The State's next asserted interest was to protect the First Amendment
freedom of those individuals who disagree with allowing same-sex couples to
marry. 328 The court quickly dismissed this argument, finding that the
amendment "does not affect any First Amendment right or responsibility of
parents to educate their children. ' 329 Furthermore, the court averred that an
individual's "moral views" could not be a sufficient justification upon which to
sustain the amendment. 330 Finally, the State asserted what the court called a
"catchall interest," which was "[a]ny other conceivable legitimate interests
identified by the parties, amici, or the court at any stage of the proceedings. 33'
Not surprisingly, the court rejected this broad assertion, holding that "[m]any of
the purported interests identified by proponents are nothing more than a fear or
unarticulated dislike of same-sex couples. 332
Ultimately, in finding that the amendment violated the plaintiffs'
fundamental right to marriage, the court stated that "what remains of the
proponents' case is an inference, amply supported by evidence in the record, that
Proposition 8 was premised on the belief that same-sex couples simply are not as
good as opposite-sex couples.

333

Also, the court applied the Equal Protection

Clause in its constitutional analysis, and unlike under federal law, determined
that homosexuals could possibly constitute a suspect class. 334 This was based
upon the fact that homosexuals were singled out for differential treatment,
denied the right to marry, despite the fact that there were no "real and undeniable
differences" between them and heterosexuals. 335 In its analysis, the court found
the amendment unconstitutional for the same reason that it found the amendment

violative of substantive due process, as the State advanced the same interests in

325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. (citation omitted).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1001.
331. Id. (quoting Defendant-ntervenors' Trial Memorandum at 8, Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292 VRW)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
332. ld. at 1002.

333. Id.
334. See id. at 997 (noting that "the court need not address the question whether laws
classifying on the basis of sexual orientation should be subject to a heightened standard of review,"
but that "[a]ll classifications based on sexual orientation appear suspect... [and] California would
rarely, if ever, have a reason to categorize individuals based on their sexual orientation").
335. Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 444 (1985))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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light of both challenges.336 Critically, the court did not approve of California's
domestic partnership 337
law, and required that same-sex couples be given the right
to marriage licenses.
Perry was substantially incorrect and yet partially reasonable. The court
made a serious mistake when it determined that the amendment violated the Due
Process Clause. In fact, the court's own analysis undermined its reasoning. To
be sure, the court claimed that history and tradition would be the framework
under which it would assess the alleged constitutional right to same-sex
marriage. 338 History and tradition, however, renders the plaintiffs' claim
unavailing, if not outright meritless. To begin with, the court was correct 339
in
finding that history and tradition overwhelmingly support a right to marriage.
However, that same tradition and history supports a right to heterosexual, not
homosexual marriage. 34 There is nothing whatsoever that can be discerned
from our nation's history that could even implicitly support a right to same-sex
marriage. 341 Consequently, the court was forced to generalize the right to
marriage so that the court could conveniently apply the right to same-sex
couples.342 One must wonder whether the court would rule the same way if there
was an amendment banning polygamous marriages. The court's ruling leaves
that question open. In other words, due process, even substantive due process,
could not even remotely support this decision.
However, the court was correct in striking down the amendment on Equal
Protection grounds. The amendment intentionally discriminated against samesex couples even though there were no reasons, rational or otherwise, to support
the differential treatment. 343 Each interest advanced by the State was either
implicitly motivated by prejudice or unlikely to be achieved simply by a ban on
same-sex marriage. 344 For example, the promotion of opposite-sex over samesex parenting could not possibly be furthered by the amendment because the ban
did not affect California's adoption laws. 345 Obviously, the State's interests
were not served by the amendment's purpose. 346 The decision was correct on
equal protection grounds.

336. See id. at 995, 997.
337. See id. at 994, 1003.
338. See id. at 992 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997)).
339. See id. at 991 ("[Flreedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
340. See generally Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 977-79 (Wash. 2006) (citations
omitted) (conducting a detailed analysis of the right to marriage in the United States and concluding
that even though "marriage has evolved, it has not included a history and tradition of same-sex
marriage in this nation").
341. See id.
342. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 993.
343. See id. at 1003.
344. See id. at 1002.
345. See id. at 1000.
346. See id. at 1003.
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Finally, if the Privileges and Immunities Clause were applicable in the way
proposed by this Article, the court would have substantially overreached. The
court should proceed incrementally and recognize rights under this clause only if
they are deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition. Otherwise, issues
such as this should be resolved through public debate and the democratic
process. For example, it would have been proper for the court to declare that
same-sex couples should have the same rights and benefits as married couples.
The court, however, should have left the option of enacting a law providing for
civil unions or marriage itself to the legislature. As a result of its overreaching,
the court left itself open for criticism that it was legislating from the bench.
C. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health
In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,347 the plaintiffs instituted an
action against the Department and Commissioner of Public Health because they
were denied marriage licenses. 348 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
analyzed whether the prohibition was 349
constitutional in light of the state's due
process and equal protection principles.
The court began its analysis by noting that "[t]he benefits accessible only by
way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and
death.... [Indeed,] 'hundreds of statutes' are related to marriage and marital
benefits. 35 ° It is for these reasons, "as well as for its intimately' personal
significance, that civil marriage has long been termed a 'civil right. '
In fact,
"The United States Supreme Court has described the right to marry as 'of
fundamental importance for all individuals' and as 'part of the fundamental
"right of privacy" implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.' 35F As a result, "Without the right to marry-or more properly, the
right to choose to marry-one is excluded from the full range of human
experience and denied full protection of the laws
for one's 'avowed commitment
353
to an intimate and lasting human relationship.'
The court then turned to the Massachusetts Constitution, which "protects
matters of personal liberty against government incursion as zealously, and often
more so, than does the Federal Constitution, even where both Constitutions

347. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
348. Id. at 950.
349. See id. at 953.
350. Id. at 955.
351. Id. at 957.
352. Id. (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)).
353. Id. (quoting Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999)). The court also discussed the
long history during which African Americans were denied the right to marriage and noted that the
denial was first held unconstitutional by California in Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). Id.
(citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Perez, 198 P.2d 17) (although the court cites to
"Perez v. Sharpe," the official reported case name is "Perez v. Lippold").
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employ essentially the same language." 354 Indeed, "The individual liberty and
equality safeguards of the Massachusetts Constitution protect both 'freedom
from' unwarranted government intrusion into protected spheres of life and
355
'freedom to' partake in benefits created by the State for the common good."
In holding that "[b]oth freedoms are involved here," the court averred "[w]hether
and whom to marry, how to express sexual intimacy, and whether to establish a
family-these are among the most basic of every individual's liberty and due
process rights. ,,356 As a result, "The Massachusetts Constitution requires, at a
minimum, that the exercise of the State's regulatory authority not be 'arbitrary or
capricious.' 357 Rather, "Under both the equality and liberty guarantees,
regulatory authority must, at very least, serve 'a legitimate purpose in a rational
way'; a statute must 'bear a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative
objective."351
In this case, the plaintiffs challenged the marriage law on due process and
equal protection grounds. 359 In determining that it would apply a rational basis
inquiry for the due process claim, the court stated that the law must "bear[] a
real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other
phases of the general welfare." 360 With respect to the equal protection claim, the
court required that "an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the
classification would serve a legitimate public
purpose that transcends the harm to
36
the members of the disadvantaged class. '
Based on both due process and equal protection grounds, the court found the
statute unconstitutional.3 62 The court rejected the State's first justification-that
the primary purpose of marriage is for procreation. 363 As the court explained,
the state's "laws of civil marriage do not privilege procreative heterosexual
intercourse between married people above every other form of adult intimacy
and every other means of creating a family." 64 Indeed, the marriage laws
"contain(] no requirement that the applicants for a marriage license attest to their
ability or intention to conceive children by coitus. ' 365 Put differently, "Fertility
is not a condition of marriage, nor is it grounds for divorce," as those individuals

354. Id. at 959.
355. Id. (footnote omitted).
356. Id.
357. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Henry's Drywall Co., 320 N.E.2d 911,914 (Mass. 1974)).
358. Id. at 960 (quoting Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 596 N.E.2d 340, 343-44
(Mass. 1992)).
359. Id.
360. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 204
N.E.2d 281, 287 (Mass. 1965)).
361. Id. (quoting English v. New England Med. Ctr., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 329, 333 (Mass. 1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
362. See id. at 961.
363. See id.
364. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207 (West 2007)).
365. Id.
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"who have never consummated their marriage, and never plan to, may be and
' 366
stay married. "
The court also rejected the State's second argument, that confining marriage
to opposite-sex couples ensures that children are raised in an "'optimal'
setting. ' 367 In holding that the ban on same-sex marriage "cannot plausibly
further this policy, 368 the court stated that "[t]he demographic changes of the
past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family [and t]he
369
composition of families varies greatly from household to household.,
Furthermore, "Massachusetts has responded supportively to 'the changing
realities of the American family,' and has moved vigorously to strengthen the
modern family in its many variations. ' 37° Also, "The 'best interests of the child'
standard does not turn on a parent's sexual orientation ... ,,371 Ultimately,
based on these and other reasons, like the State's concession that same-sex
couples could be excellent parents, the Court held that the State "has offered no
evidence that forbidding marriage to people of the same sex will increase the
to enter into opposite-sex marriages in order to have
number of couples' choosing
372
and raise children.
The final reason advanced by the State was that "limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples furthers the Legislature's interest in conserving scarce State
and private financial resources. 373 The State contended that the court "logically
could assume that same-sex couples are more financially independent than
married couples and thus less needy of public marital benefits, such as tax
advantages, or private marital benefits,' 374such as employer-financed health plans
that include spouses in their coverage. ,
The court found this last argument meritless. 375 In so doing, it averred that
the State's "conclusory generalization-that same-sex couples are less
financially dependent on each other than opposite-sex couples-ignores that
many same-sex couples, such as many of theplaintiffs in this case, have children
Furthermore, "Massachusetts
and other dependents... in their care." 376
marriage laws do not condition receipt of public and private financial benefits to
married individuals on a demonstration of financial dependence on each other;
the benefits are available to married couples regardless of whether they mingle

366. Id.
367. See id. at 962.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 962-63 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
370. Id. (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64).
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 964.
374. Id.
375. See id.
376. Id.
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their finances or actually depend on each other for support., 377 Based on these
reasons, as well as those stated above, the statute was found unconstitutional.378
The court's decision is a classic example of an unjustifiable exercise of
judicial power. First, while the court claimed that it was adjudicating this matter
under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of its constitution, the
court never engaged in a separate analysis of either clause. 379 Moreover, the
court seemed to simply merge each clause into a single discussion, despite
stating that there are independent standards for each clause. 380 Second, the court
simply took for granted the fact that there are substantive liberty and privacy
interests embedded in the Due Process Clause that are focused upon process.
It is as if the court could not even conceive a situation where the judiciary would
act with restraint and not read rights into the Due Process Clause that have no
basis whatsoever. The court's respect for legislative authority was non-existent.
This usurpation was evident in the fact that the court did not even give the
legislature the opportunity to decide whether to provide same-sex couples with
the benefits and protections of marriage through civil unions or by amending the
marriage statute. 382 The court simply decided that same-sex couples were
entitled to marriage itself,383 even though the entire opinion did not focus on a
deprivation of marriage, but instead upon the denial of benefits and protections
attendant to marriage. 384 If, under the three-part proposal advocated in this
Article, the court applied the Privileges and Immunities Clause, it would have
been an unprecedented and unwarranted exercise of judicial power.
D. Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning
In Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning,385 gay and lesbian advocate
groups sued the State of Nebraska challenging that a state constitutional
amendment restricting marriage only to opposite-sex couples violated, inter alia,
the federal Equal Protection Clause.
The district court found the amendment
unconstitutional 387 and the State appealed to the Eighth Circuit. The plaintiffs
relied on Romer v. Evans,388 where the Supreme Court invalidated an

377. Id.
378. See id. at 968.
379. See id. at 953-68 (citations omitted).
380. See id.
381. See id. at 957 n.15 ("The rights implicated in this case are at the core of individual
privacy and autonomy.").
382. See id. at 969.
383. See id.
384. Id. at 953-69.
385. 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006).
386. Id. at 863.
387. Id. (citing Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005),
rev'd, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006)).
388. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol63/iss2/3

46

Lamparello: Taking the Substance out of Substantive Due Process to the Federa

2011]

TAKING THE "SUBSTANCE" OUT OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

331

amendment to the Colorado constitution which "barr[ed] all state and local
governments from allowing homosexual, lesbian or bisexual. .. conduct... to
be the basis for a claim of ...protected status or claim of discrimination., 389 In
finding the amendment unconstitutional, the Romer Court held that the
amendment "withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal
protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids
reinstatement of these laws and policies." 390 Further,
The Court reasoned that the amendment "fails, indeed defies,"
conventional equal protection analysis because it "impos[es] a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group... [and] its sheer
breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class
it affects."'3 9'
Consequently, in applying the normally deferential392rational basis review, the
Romer Court found the amendment unconstitutional.
The plaintiffs also argued before the Eighth Circuit that the amendment
raised "an insurmountable political barrier to same-sex couples obtaining the
many governmental and private sector benefits that are based upon a legally
valid marriage relationship." 393 While the plaintiffs did not assert a "right to
marriage or same-sex unions," they did "seek 'a level playing field, an equal
elected representatives that same-sex
opportunity to convince the people's
' 394
relationships deserve legal protection. '
The Eighth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' claim, and reversed the district
court's ruling. 395 The court began its analysis by determiing the proper level of
scrutiny that should be applied to the plaintiffs' claim. 39 After examining
relevant decisional law, the court found that the amendment "should receive
rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, rather than a heightened
level of judicial scrutiny." 397 In so holding, the court referred to Justice Scalia's
discussion of anti-polygamy statutes, stating that "chaos ...would result if all
enactments that allegedly deprive a group of 'equal' political access must
survive the rigors of strict judicial scrutiny., 398 Indeed, while Romer did

389. Citizens for Equal Prot., 455 F.3d at 864 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 624) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
390. Id. at 865 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 627) (internal quotation marks omitted).
391. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 632).
392. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635-36.
393. Citizensfor Equal Prot., 455 F.3d at 865.
394. Id. (quoting Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 n.1 (D.
Neb. 2005), rev'd, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006)).
395. See id. at 871.
396. See id. at 866.
397. Id.
398. Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648-51 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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invalidate the Colorado amendment, its "conclusion was that the enactment
'lacks a rational relationship to legtimate state interests[,]' [which] is the core
standard of rational-basis review."
In applying rational basis review, the court explained that it is "highly
deferential to the legislature or, in this case, to the electorate that directly adopted
[the amendment] by the initiative process."'4 Specifically, "In areas of social
and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along
suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld
against [an] equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable
'4
state of facts that could provide a rational-basis for the classification. 01
Importantly, "[L]aws defining marriage as the union between one man and one
woman [are] afforded a 'strong presumption of validity."' 4 2 Additionally, "The
Equal Protection Clause 'is not a license
for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness,
3
or logic of [the voters'] choices."40
Against this backdrop, the court upheld the amendment. 4°4 Applying history
and tradition, the court noted that "the institution of marriage has always been, in
our federal system, the predominant concern of state government.
In fact,
"The Supreme Court long ago declared, and recently reaffirmed, that a State 'has
[an] absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation
between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be
dissolved.' -4 6 As such, the court determined that "[t]his necessarily includes
the power to classify those persons who may validly marry."''4 7 Thus, "In this
constitutional environment, rational-basis review must be particularly
deferential.,,4 8
The court then examined and found rational the State's interests in
restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples. 4°9 The State's first interest was that
"defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman and extending a
variety of benefits to married couples are rationally related to the government
interest in 'steering procreation into marriage.' ''410 Indeed, by affording such
benefits and protections, "such laws 'encourage procreation to take place within
the socially recognized unit that is best suited for raising children.' ' ' 4 1' The

399. Id. (citation omitted) (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 632).
400. Id. at 867.
401. Id. (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
402. Id. (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993)).
403. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313).
404. Id. at 871.
405. Id. at 867.
406. Id. (quoting Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer
v.Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)).
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 967-68 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)).
410. Id. at 867.
411. Id.
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State's argument was predicated "on the traditional notion that two committed
heterosexuals are the optimal partnership for raising children, which modern-day
homosexual parents understandably decry. 41 2 Ultimately, the court, without
conducting any analysis, accepted the State's claim, holding that "[w]hatever our
personal views regarding this political and sociological debate, we cannot
conclude that the State's justification 'lacks a rational relationship to legitimate
state interests.''41 3 Consequently, the "expressed intent of traditional marriage
laws-to encourage heterosexual couples to bear and raise children" was found
to satisfy the rational basis inquiry.414
The court's decision is less important than the reasoning it used to arrive at
its result. Certainly the court was correct in finding that same-sex marriage did
not qualify as a fundamental right.4 15 The court was also correct in holding that

the state retained wide latitude in regulating marriage and setting conditions
concerning the marital relationship. 4 16 Where the court went wrong, however,
was in its equal protection analysis. Simply stated, there was no equal protection
analysis. The court was arguably correct in determining that same-sex couples
did not warrant strict scrutiny.41 7 However, the court's rational basis review was
far too deferential. It simply set forth the State's main reasons for restricting
marriage to opposite-sex couples, and proceeded to accept them without any
analysis whatsoever. 418 The court did not discuss why same-sex marriage would
undermine the State's interest in procreation, or why opposite-sex couples
somehow provide a more stable home environment than same-sex couples. The
court's decision was devoid of substance and lacked the kind of reasoning that
even rational basis review requires.
E. Lewis v. Harris
Finally, in Lewis v. Harris,4 19 plaintiffs, same-sex couples, instituted an
action against New Jersey State officials due to their failure to issue the
plaintiffs' marriage licenses. 420 The plaintiffs alleged that the state's domestic
partnership law violated the constitutional right to liberty, due process, and equal
protection. 421 The court was, therefore, confronted with the issues of whether

412. Id.
413. Id. at 867-68 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 632).
414. Id. at 868-69.
415. See id. at 867 (noting that the prohibition on same-sex marriage was only entitled to
rational basis scrutiny).
416. See id.
417. See id.
418. See id.
419. 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
420. Id. at 200-01.
421. See id. at 200.
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the plaintiffs had (1) a fundamental right to marriage, and (2) suffered
unconstitutional discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.422
The court began its analysis with a discussion of whether there was a
fundamental right to same-sex marriage. 423 In assessing their "liberty claim," the
court focused on "whether the right of a person to marry someone of the same
sex is so deeply rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of our people
that it must be deemed fundamental. 424 The court explained that "[w]e 'look to
the traditions and [collective] conscience of our people to determine whether a
principle is so rooted [there] ... as to be ranked as fundamental. ' '' 425 The court
then stated that its substantive due process analysis ultimately involved a twostep inquiry. 426 In addition to examining history and tradition, the court
427stated
that "the asserted fundamental liberty interest must be clearly identified.,
The court explained that the right to marry, at both the federal and state
level, is a fundamental right. 428 Importantly, however, "the liberty interest at
stake is not some undifferentiated, abstract right to marriage, but rather the right
of people of the same sex to marry. ' 429 Thus, the court stated that "we are

concerned only with the question of whether the right to same-sex marriage 43is0
deeply rooted in this State's history and its people's collective conscience.,
Based on this framework, the court found that "New Jersey's civil marriage
statutes .... which were first enacted in 1912, limit marriage to heterosexual
couples.,9431 Furthermore, "in passing the Domestic Partnership Act[,] 432
... the
Legislature explicitly acknowledged that same-sex couples cannot marry.
Perhaps most importantly, "'[d]espite winds of change,' there was almost a
universal recognition that 'a lawful marriage requires the performance of a
ceremonial marriage of two persons of the opposite sex, a male and a
female.' 433 The court provided further justification:
Although today there is a nationwide public debate raging over
whether same-sex marriage should be authorized under the laws or
constitutions of the various states, the framers of the 1947 New Jersey
Constitution, much less the drafters of our marriage statutes, could not

422. See id. at 200.
423. Id. at 206-11 (citations omitted).
424. Id. at 206.
425. Id. at 207 (alteration in original) (quoting King v. S. Jersey Nat'l Bank, 330 A.2d 1, 10
(N.J. 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
426. Id.
427. id.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 208.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d. 204, 207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1976)).
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have imagined that the liberty right protected by [the New Jersey
Constitution] embraced the right of a person to marry someone of his or
her own sex. 434

[Accordingly,] despite the rich diversity of this State, the tolerance
and goodness of its people, and the many recent advances made by gays
and lesbians toward achieving social acceptance and equality under the
law, we cannot find that a right to same-sex marriage is so deeply rooted
of the people of this State that
in the traditions, history, and conscience
4 35
it ranks as a fundamental right.
This, however, did not end the inquiry. The next issue was whether New

Jersey's statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. 436 The court began by
stating that "[wihen a statute is challenged on the ground that it does not apply
evenhandedly to similarly situated people, our equal protection jurisprudence
requires that the legislation, in distinguishing between two classes of people,
43 7
bear a substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.,
Moreover, "The test that we have applied to such equal protection claims
involves the weighing of three factors: the nature of the right at stake, the extent
to which the challenged statutory scheme restricts that right, and the public need
for the statutory restriction." 438 Indeed, "The test is a flexible one, measuring the
439
importance of the right against the need for the governmental restriction.,
Furthermore, "Under that approach, each claim is examined 'on a continuum that
reflects the nature of the burdened right and the importance of the governmental
restriction.' "44 As a result, "The more personal the right, the greater the public
need must be to justify governmental interference with the exercise of that
right."'441 Ultimately, therefore, "[ulnless the public need justifies statutorily
' 2
limiting the exercise of a claimed right, the State's action is deemed arbitrary.
In applying this test, the court found that the law violated the Equal
Protection Clause.443 First, the court examined the substantial number of
benefits that were provided to heterosexual couples, such as tax deductions and
survivor benefits, yet denied to same sex couples."" Also, the court noted that
the Domestic Partnership Act "provides no comparable presumption of dual

434. Id. at 209.
435. Id. at 211.
436. See id.
437. Id.at 212 (citing Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 842 A.2d 125, 132 (N.J. 2004)).
438. Id.(citing Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 302 (N.J. 1985)).
439. Id.
440. Id.(quoting Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 828 A.2d 306, 315 (N.J. 2003)).
441. Id.(quoting George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Turnpike Auth., 644 A.2d 76, 87 (N.J.
1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
442. Id.
443. Id.at 220-21.
444. Id. at 215 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN § 34:15-13 (West 2011); § 54A:3-3(a) (West 2002)).
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445
parentage to the non-biological parent of a child born to a domestic partner."
Accordingly, "partners must [have] rel[ied] on costly and time-consuming
second-parent adoption procedures." 446 Moreover, the Act was "silent on critical
issues relating to custody, visitation, and partner and child support in the event a
domestic partnership terminates. ''44 Based on these and other factors, the court
found that "the economic and financial inequities that are borne by same-sex
domestic partners are borne by their children too ...[because they] are
448
disadvantaged in a way that children in married households are not."
Consequently, it was without question that "same-sex couples and their children
the benefits and protections available to similar heterosexual
are not afforded
449
households."
The court then assessed the State's justification for these distinctions, and
found them insufficient. Specifically, the court held that the legislature had not
"articulated any legitimate public need for depriving same-sex couples of the
host of benefits and privileges" provided to married couples. 450 The differential
treatment, to be sure, was contrary to "the public policy of this State, [which
was] to eliminate sexual orientation discrimination and support legally
sanctioned domestic partnerships.", 45' In fact, the court found it inconsistent that
the legislature had previously enacted a law prohibiting discriminating against
simultaneously deprived them
individuals on the basis of sexual orientation, yet
452
of benefits when they were together as couples.
The court also continued to focus on the fact that, by depriving domestic
partners of the benefits attendant to marriage, children also suffer adverse
consequences.453 For example, the court saw no "purpose in not affording the
child of a same-sex parent, who is a volunteer firefighter or first-aid responder,
454
tuition assistance when the child of married parents, receive such assistance.,
In addition, the court found it "distinctly unfair about the State recognizing the
right of same-sex couples to raise natural and adopted children and placing foster
children with those couples, and yet denying those children the financial and
social benefits and privileges available to children in heterosexual
households. 4 55 For these reasons, there was no "rational basis for visiting on
those children a flawed and unfair scheme directed at their parents., 456 Put
differently, "To the extent that families are strengthened by encouraging

445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.

Id. at 216 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN § 9:17-43-44 (West 2002)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 217.
Id.

451. Id.

452. See id.
453. Id. at 218.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
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monogamous relationships, whether heterosexual or homosexual, we cannot
discern any public need that would justify the legal disabilities that now afflict
same-sex domestic partnerships. '457 Consequently, the court held in favor of the
plaintiffs, and gave the legislature 180 days to either amend its marriage laws or
revise the Domestic Partnership Act to provide homosexuals with the same
rights, benefits, and protections that are afforded to married couples.458
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision represents the best application of
the three-part proposal. First, the court could have, and should have, repudiated
the substantive due process doctrine. However, they did the next best thing, the
court interpreted the doctrine in a narrow fashion, where it recognized as
fundamental only those rights that were deeply rooted in our nation's history and
tradition. 45 9 Second, the court required that fundamental rights be asserted with
specificity, that is, it correctly declined to find as fundamental a right to sameThis was a
sex marriage under the generalized notion of the right to marry.
perfect example of judicial restraint, modesty, and deference to the legislature.
Furthermore, by considering the specific nature of the right, the court did not risk
future uncertainty for other groups to assert violations of respective marriage
statutes, for example, polygamists, under the broad notion of a right to marry.
The only problem is that the court should have used the Privileges and
Immunities Clause in denying, based on history and tradition, a fundamental
right to gay marriage.
Third, the court's equal protection inquiry was exacting, balanced, and
thorough. Here, the court was not making new law, usurping the legislature's
lawmaking function, or interfering with the democratic process. Instead, the
court was safeguarding the plaintiffs' rights to equal protection under the law,
namely, the right of same-sex couples to enjoy the same benefits and protections
as opposite-sex couples. In making this determination, the court properly
assessed the legislature's reasons for the discriminatory treatment by applying a
reasonable standard of review, and its decision was based both upon legal and
practical principles. There was nothing in its equal protection analysis that
evinced judicial overreaching.
The U.S. Supreme Court's use of the three-tiered paradigm suggested in this
Article should contain a mixture of the analyses explained in the previous cases.
First, although no cases have addressed the issue, the Supreme Court needs to
abandon the substantive due process doctrine. It was, and continues to be, a
mistake. As such, the Court needs to overrule, at a minimum, Griswold and Roe.
The subject of abortion was and remains a highly divisive issue, and it should be
the prerogative of each state, through the democratic process, to enact laws that
express its moral and social views on this issue. It is not for the Court to force
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459.
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Id.
See id. at 224.
See id. at 208.
See id. at 209.
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policy upon fifty states. Second, using the six factors enunciated in this Article,
the Court should take a more active approach under the Equal Protection Clause.
Finally, the Court should repudiate the Slaughter-House Cases, and revive the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. In doing so, however, the Court should take a
modest and incremental approach toward recognizing new rights as fundamental.
Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, it should require that such rights be deeply
rooted in our nation's history and tradition, and described with specificity so that
the true nature of the right can be analyzed against constitutional standards. This
framework will ensure a proper balance because the legislature will retain
lawmaking power, while the courts will ensure that such laws do not transgress
constitutional safeguards.
V.

CONCLUSION

It would be a great moment in our nation's history if same-sex couples were
afforded the right to marry in every state. It is also important that women have
reproductive freedom, and that we not go back to the days where women were
having illegal abortions and putting their health and well-being at great risk.
These, and other policies, are important for our country, and based on the
principles of freedom, liberty, and equality. The problem, however, is how we
got there-the Court, through an unprecedented and unconstitutional use of its
judicial power, improperly withdrew these issues from public debate and
legislative action. The Court acted in a manner that compromised the power of
the people to make law through the process that the Constitution envisioned. In
other words, process matters. The means we use are just as important as the end
we achieve, and the means need to change. It is time for a realignment of our
federal structure, so that current and future issues can be decided in a manner
where the courts serve a protective rather than activist function. The courts
should safeguard rights through the Equal Protection Clause, not rewrite the
Constitution through substantive due process. If we respect this idea, then the
laws we make will truly be the law of the people, and not of unelected and
unaccountable judges.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol63/iss2/3

54

